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THE ROAD TO PRISON IS PAVED WITH
BAD EVALUATIONS: THE CASE FOR
FUNCTIONAL BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENTS
AND BEHAVIOR INTERVENTION PLANS
STEPHANIE M. POUCHER*
In 1997, Congress amended the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act ("IDEA ") to include provisions meant to assist school districts in
educating students with behavioral needs. These amendments required schools
to use functional behavioral assessments ("FBA") and behavior intervention
plans ("BIP") under certain circumstances. Congress did not, however,
include a definition of or substantive requirements for either system of behavior
management. As a result, although BIPs and FBAs are now federally
mandated requirements, and it is clear that disregarding behavioral issues is a
denial of a free appropriate public education ("FAPE"), the 1DEA's adjudicative
standard, there is no clear consensus as to whether a student with behavioral
needs must have an FBA or a BIP or what either must include. The IDEA's
lack of guidance has resulted in inconsistent and often contradictory court
rulings, and the lack of specific definitions and procedures has allowed schools
to develop purportedly legal but substantively deficient behavior evaluations
and intervention plans for special needs students.
Despite this confusion, some courts have properly looked to the
administrative record for guidance on the substantive elements of FBAs and
BIPs. Deference to hearing officers, along with other provisions within the
IDEA, such as Child Find and inclusion obligations, may assist courts in
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determining whether a school's failure to use an FBA and a Bf for a student with
behavioral needs falls short of Board of Education v. Rowley's requirements for
FAPE. FBAs and BlPs aim to prevent and correct student misconduct before it
escalates and results in drastic disciplinary action. Given the impact punitive
school discipline policies have had on students with special needs, the added
procedural safeguards these proactive behavior management schemes could
provide are imperative to dismantling the school-toprison pipeline.
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Everybody is a genius.
But if you judge a fish by its ability to climb a tree,
it will live its whole life believing that it is stupid.
- Albert Einstein'
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, the United States has placed increasing emphasis
on the importance of educating all children, regardless of their
disabilities.' This interest fueled Congress's passage of the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975' ("EAHCA") and its
successor, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act' ("IDEA" or
"Act"). The modern IDEA requires that every "child with a
disability"5 receive a "free appropriate public education"' ("FAPE").
Despite these developments, many children with disabilities continue
to fall through the cracks, and many are ultimately funneled into the
1. Valerie Strauss, 'Let's Stop Measuring Fish by How Well They Climb Trees, WASH.
PosT (May 24, 2014) (quoting Albert Einstein), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
answer-sheet/wp/2014/05/24/lets-stop-measuring-fish-by-how-well-they-climb-trees.
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2012) (stating that millions of children with
disabilities were not receiving proper education before the enactment of the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975). Educators, scholars, and the
U.S. government use the terms disability, special needs, special education, behavioral
needs, and behavioral disorders interchangeably. This Comment does the same.
3. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-
45) (increasing access to education for students with disabilities, but containing
fewer guidelines and standards than its current iteration, the IDEA).
4. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-82 (2012). Congress passed the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act's ("IDEA") predecessor, the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act ("EAHCA"), in 1975. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(1975). Prior to that, Congress passed section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in 1973
and Amendments to the Education of the Handicapped Act in 1974. Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1988)); Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 612-15, 88 Stat.
484, 579-83. These acts set the stage for the EAHCA in 1975. See Mark C. Weber,
The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A Study in the Interpretation of
Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 349, 358-59 (1990) (chronicling earlier
legislation that paved the way for the current protections for disabled students).
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A).
6. § 1401(9). Free appropriate public education ("FAPE"), as defined in the
IDEA, includes "special education and related services that[:] (A) have been
provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without
charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an
appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the
State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education
program required under section 1414(d) of this title." Id.
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juvenile justice system.7 One solution to this issue may be found
within the current IDEA; the most recent version of the Act includes
methods to better support students with behavioral needs: functional
behavioral assessments' ("FBAs") and behavior intervention plans'
("BIPs"). While some jurisdictions have interpreted these provisions
as requiring specific procedures, the lack of which constitutes an
IDEA violation,'o others have read them as merely aspirational, granting
schools wide deference in implementing BIPs with seemingly
meaningless goals." These unclear standards and contradictory court
rulings have led to disparate results for disabled students.12
7. See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LOCATING THE SCHOOL-TO-PluSON
PIPELINE (2008) [hereinafter ACLU, LOCATING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE],
https://www.aclu.org/files/images/assetupload file966_35553.pdf (arguing that schools
lacking adequate resources summarily suspend and expel students, pushing them into the
juvenile justice system-a problem that significantly affects special-needs children).
8. § 1415(k) (D) (providing for functional behavioral assessments ("FBAs") for
children with disabilities without defining such assessments); see also Erika Blood &
Richard S. Neel, From FBA to Implementation: A Look At What Is Actually Being Delivered,
30 EDUC. & TREATMENT OF CHILD. 67, 68 (2007) (citing George Sugai et al., Applying
Positive Behavior Support and Functional Behavioral Assessment in Schools, 2 J. PoSITrvE
BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 131, 137 (2000)) (explaining that an FBA is an effective
method of providing a targeted intervention based on a student's particular problem
behavior and the context of that behavior).
9. § 1415(k) (F) (providing for behavioral intervention plans ("BIPs") but
providing no definition); see Behavior Intervention Plan, PUB. SCHOOLS N.C., STATE
BOARD OF EDUC., http://ec.ncpublicschools.gov/instructional-resources/behavior-
support/resources/behavior-intervention-plan (last visited Dec. 1, 2015) (explaining
that North Carolina Public Schools define the BIP as "a plan to support the student
in order to help him or her change behavior. Effective support plans consist of
multiple interventions or support strategies and are not punishment. Positive
behavioral intervention plans increase the acquisition and use of new alternative
skills, decrease the problem behavior and facilitate general improvements in the
quality of life of the individual, his or her family, and members of the support
team"); infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (explaining the commonly
accepted definitions of BIPs and FBAs).
10. See, e.g., C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 80 (2d Cir.
2014); Long v. District of Columbia, 780 F. Supp. 2d 49, 60-61 (D.D.C. 2011); Harris
v. District of Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2008).
11. See, e.g., M.W. exrel. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep'tofEduc., 725 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir.
2013); Park Hill Sch. Dist. v. Dass, 655 F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 2011); Alex R. ex rel.
Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2004).
12. Compare Alex R, 375 F.3d at 615, 618 (holding that, despite a student's
continued behavioral problems, his BIP was sufficient because the IDEA lacks any
substantive criteria relating to BIPs, and the school district took a "measured"
approach to creating the plan), with Harris, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 6 (finding that the school
district's failure to conduct an FBA at the plaintiffs request was a substantive violation as
it undermined the IDEA's effectiveness and deprived the plaintiff of FAPE), and Sch. Bd.
v. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928, 947 (E.D. Va. 2010) (ruling that a procedural violation
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This Comment will argue that when a school does not conduct an
FBA and implement a BIP for a student with behavioral needs, the
school has denied that student FAPE. A failure to utilize both systems
of behavior modification for a student with behavioral needs violates
the procedural requirements of the IDEA and results in the child's
loss of an educational benefit.
Congress's failure to provide clear procedural and substantive
standards for FBAs and BIPs has caused confusion in the education
realm and among the courts. Notwithstanding the vague
requirements Congress created for FBAs and BIPs, other aspects of
the IDEA clarify that a school's failure to assess and support special
needs children in all areas of their disability using peer-reviewed
techniques uniquely designed to meet a child's needs prevents an
education plan from being "reasonably calculated"" to provide
educational benefits. This Comment will argue that Congress should
amend the IDEA to incorporate more specific guidance on when
FBAs and BIPs are required and what elements they must contain. By
amending the IDEA to include substantive requirements for FBAs
and BIPs, Congress will create clearer standards for schools and,
ultimately, better results for children.
This Comment proceeds in three Parts. Part I will provide a brief
overview of the IDEA's history, the social strains that led to the
inclusion of FBAs and BIPs in the 1997 IDEA, and the divergent
methods courts have used in deciding whether a school's failure to
implement either behavior modification strategy is a denial of FAPE.
This Part will also detail the U.S. Supreme Court's understanding of
FAPE and the ways in which the lower courts have applied this
standard to FBAs and BIPs. Part II argues that looking collectively to
the Court's holding in Board ofEducation v. Rowley," which established
the adjudicative standard for FAPE, Congress's intent in passing the
IDEA, and the Act's plain language, shows that students are entitled
to FBAs and BIPs not only when they incur a change in placement,
but also when behavioral issues impede their access to education.
This Part will consider the substantive requirements for behavior
reform strategies by looking to the standards in the IDEA for FBAs
and BIPs, as discussed in Part I. This Comment concludes by
recommending that Congress amend the IDEA to clarify when students
preventing meaningful access to education deprives a disabled child of FAPE).
13. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982).
14. 458 U.S. 176, 203-04 (1982).
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are entitled to FBAs and BIPs and to include specific substantive
standards for these behavior strategies when they are required.
I. ON THE PATH TO EQUITY: HOW THE IDEA HAS HELPED STUDENTS
WITH DISABILITIES AND THE LONGJOURNEY AHEAD
Since Congress's initial passage of the IDEA in 1974, the United
States has made strides in including students with disabilities in
mainstream society.'" Inclusion in general education classrooms,
however, continues to be a struggle for students with behavioral
needs. These students are suspended and expelled at a much higher
rate than their general education-track peers, which often leads to
incarceration." These outcomes substantially limit the IDEA's goals
of inclusion and self-sufficiency."
Congress has amended and reauthorized the IDEA many times,
codifying greater procedural safeguards for students and their
parents.' The most recent authorization of the IDEA, passed in
2004, includes many of the 1997 Act's provisions geared toward
supporting students with behavioral needs and addressing the
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3) (2012) (finding that "[s]ince the enactment and
implementation of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, this
chapter has been successful in ensuring children with disabilities and the families of
such children access to a free appropriate public education and in improving
educational results for children with disabilities").
16. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, TALKING POINTS: THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON
PIPELINE [hereinafter ACLU, TALKING POINTS], https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
stpp-talkingpoints.pdf (explaining that children with special learning or behavioral
needs are more likely to be forced from regular school programs and into the
criminal justice system); see also ADVANCEMENT PROJEcr, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN:
THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 16 (2005) [hereinafter EDUCATION ON
LOCKDOWN], http://www.ywcamadison.org/atf/cf/%7B2487BDOF-90C7-49BC-858D-
CC50637ECE23%7D/SchooltoPrisonEducationLockdownreduced.pdf (arguing
that high rates of recidivism among suspended students demonstrate the
ineffectiveness of out-of-school and unsupervised suspensions).
17. See § 1400(c)(1) (describing the IDEA's aspirational goal of self-sufficiency
for special needs students).
18. See §§ 1414(d)(1)(B), 1415(b)(1) (providing that a parent has the right to
participate in all meetings concerning the child's education, examine the child's
school records, and obtain an independent educational evaluation); § 1415(c)(1)
(requiring a school to notify a parent whenever the school proposes changes to
certain aspects of the child's education); § 1415(f)(1)(A) (stating that a parent may
challenge a school's educational decisions regarding the child and require an
"impartial due process hearing" conducted by an unbiased hearing officer); §
1415(f)-(g) (allowing an educational rights holder to appeal a hearing officer's
decision to the local education agency ("LEA")); § 1415(i) (2) (explaining that, if a
party does not have the right to appeal under § 1415(f)-(g), it can bring a civil
action in state or federal district court).
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precarious subject of school discipline." These provisions, which
encourage the use of FBAs and BIPs, have nebulous standards.20 This
uncertainty has led to an inconsistent implementation of FBAs and
BIPs in schools and capricious interpretations in the judicial system."
Courts have attempted to apply FBAs and BIPs to the standard for
FAPE the Supreme Court announced in Rowley," but have failed to
identify a coherent, uniform standard in the absence of a statutory
definition." Despite this confusion, courts have properly looked to
the administrative record for guidance on the substantive elements of
FBAs and BIPs." Deference to hearing officers, along with other
provisions within the IDEA, such as Child Find and inclusion
obligations, may assist courts in determining whether a school's
failure to utilize an FBA and BIP for a student with behavioral needs
falls short of Rowley's standard for FAPE.
19. See ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR. & CHARLES J. Russo, SPECIAL EDUCATION AND THE
IAw: A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS 162 (3d ed. 2014) (explaining that after facing
"pressure from advocates for both school boards and students with disabilities,
Congress added disciplinary provisions to the IDEA in 1997").
20. See, e.g., Susan C. Bon & Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Does the Failure to Conduct an
FBA or Develop a BIP Result in a Denial of a FAPE Under the IDEA , 307 EDUc. L. REP.
581, 586-87 (2014) (stating that the IDEA largely provides unclear legal standards for
FBAs and BIPs); Mickey L. Losinski et al., Recent Case Law Regarding Functional Behavioral
Assessments: Implications for Practice, 49 INTERVENTION ScH. & CINIc 251, 252 (2013)
(lamenting the lack of federal regulations and guidance regarding FBAs and BIPs).
21. See discussion infra notes 155-79 and accompanying text (exploring courts'
differing interpretations of the lack of an FBA and BIP).
22. 458 U.S. 176, 203-04 (1982) (holding that a state satisfies FAPE as required
by the IDEA when the child receives personalized instruction with support services
that allow the child to benefit educationally and the state provides these services at
public expense, meet the educational standards set by the state for regular education, and
are in accordance with the child's individualized education program ("IEP")).
23. See Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for Functional Behavior Assessments and Behavior
Intervention Plans: An Empirical Analysis, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 175, 203 (2011)
[hereinafter Zirkel, Empirical Analysis] (discussing how the lack of definitions in the
IDEA for both FBAs and BIPs have left courts to evaluate whether a student has
received FAPE based on evidentiary and reasonable benefit standards).
24. See, e.g., S. Kingston Sch. Comm. v. Joanna S. ex rel. P.J.S., 773 F.3d 344, 349
(1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that the proper level of district court review "falls
somewhere between the highly deferential clear-error standard and the non-
deferential de novo standard" (quoting Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg'1 Sch. Dist.,
685 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2012))).
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A. Students with Disabilities and the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Addressing
Student Behavior in the IDEA
Although the IDEA has been a catalyst for improving the lives of
students with disabilities," school policies aimed at maintaining safety
have prevented the realization of the IDEA's full potential." In
particular, school behavioral policies have disproportionately
impacted students with behavioral disorders, resulting in increased
suspensions and expulsions for these populations compared to
students with different disabilities." The effects these school
discipline policies have had on special needs students-what is
referred to as the school-to-prison pipeline"-contributed to
Congress's revision of the IDEA in 1997, which added better supports
for students with behavioral needs in an effort to temper the surge of
disabled students into the juvenile justice system."
This step toward better social and educational outcomes for
students came in the form of two relatively unused systems in the
special education field: FBAs and BIPs.so Though the IDEA and
applicable regulations provide little guidance on what an FBA or BIP
25. See OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TWENIY-FIVE
YEARS OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN wrrH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA (2007),
http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.pdf (detailing advances in the
provision of effective programs and services for early intervention, education in
local public schools, and improved rates of graduation and post-graduate
employment for special needs children).
26. See generally ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: How "ZERO
TOLERANCE" AND HIGH-STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON
PIPELINE (2010) [hereinafter TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT],
http://www.advancementproject.org/resources/entry/test-punish-and-push-out-
how-zero-tolerance-and-high-stakes-testing-funnel (providing research suggesting
that school policies meant to increase safety, such as zero-tolerance policies, fail to
create a safer learning environment).
27. Michael P. Krezmien et al., Suspension, Race, and Disability: Analysis of Statewide
Practices and Reporting, 14 J. EMOTIONAL & BEHAV. DISORDERS 217, 218 (2006); see
ACLU, TALKING POINTS, supra note 16 (explaining that students with disabilities
represent 8.6% of the school-age population but "are represented in jail at a rate
nearly four times that" (footnote omitted)).
28. See ACLU, TALKING POINTS, supra note 16 (explaining that the school-to-
prison pipeline refers to the "national trend of criminalizing, rather than educating,
our nation's children" through the use of zero-tolerance discipline, in-school arrests, and
increased suspension and expulsion, which work to deny education to at-risk youth).
29. Antonis Katsiyannis et al., Reflections on the 25th Anniversary of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 22 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 324, 331 (2001).
30. SeeJ. Ron Nelson et al., Has Public Policy Exceeded Our Knowledge Base? A Review
of the Functional Behavioral Assessment Literature, 24 BEHAv. DISORDERS 169, 170-71 (1999)
(noting that in the past, educators did not evaluate "the internal and external
determinants of problem behavior when developing intervention or treatment plans").
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is and are silent on what they must contain,1 educators have
established generally accepted definitions for both FBAs and BIPs.
FBAs "include[] the full range of procedures used by researchers and
other professionals to identify internal and external events related to
the occurrence of a target behavior."3 ' A BIP, moreover, is "[b]ased
on the foundation provided by [an] FBA[] ... [and] is a concrete plan
of action for reducing problem behaviors, dictated by the particular
needs of the student exhibiting the behaviors."33 Indeed, many states
have codified requirements of FBAs and BIPs based on these generally
accepted definitions to fill the gaps in the federal Act.3
Since Congress required FBAs and BIPs, however, the
amendment's shortcomings have become apparent: though it
created a vague procedural requirement that schools conduct FBAs
and implement BIPs, Congress failed to promulgate specific standards
for schools to follow, leaving educators and courts to flesh out
definitions of FBAs and BIPs without congressional guidance.3 ' This
deficiency has prevented FBAs and BIPs from having a meaningful
impact in the fight to dismantle the school-to-prison pipeline."
31. U.S. Department of Education guidance on the regulations offers two
explanations for FBAs: "[a]n FBA focuses on identifying the function or purpose
behind a child's behavior. Typically, the process involves looking closely at a wide
range of child-specific factors (e.g., social, affective, environmental). Knowing why a
child misbehaves is directly helpful to the IEP Team in developing a BIP that will
reduce or eliminate the misbehavior[]" and that "[t]he FBA process is frequently
used to determine the nature and extent of the special education and related
services that the child needs, including the need for a BIP." U.S. DEP'T OF EDuc.,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON DISCIPLINE PROCEDURES 14-15 (2009),
http://idea.ed.gov/explore/view/p/%2Croot%2Cdynamic%2CQaCorner%2C7%2C.
32. Nelson et al., supra note 30, at 169-70 (detailing the FBA's goal of
hypothesis-driven treatment, skill building, positive outcomes, and program
maintenance, and examining the effectiveness of the FBA's intensive assessments
as compared to less rigorous review).
33. Zirkel, Empirical Analysis, supra note 23, at 175.
34. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 226.75 (2015) (creating guidelines for
FBAs); 511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-32-41 (2015) (defining FBA); MINN. R. 3525.0850
(2013) (creating guidelines for BIPs); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.1(r)
(2015) (listing requirements for, and defining, an FBA).
35. John W. Maag & Antonis Katsiyannis, Behavioral Intervention Plans: Legal and
Practical Considerations for Students with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, 31 BEHAV.
DISORDERS 348, 348, 352, 356-57 (2006).
36. See discussion infta notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
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1. The lDEA's oigins and background
Before 1960, society held a negative perception of disabled
children, often leaving them ostracized from mainstream society."
Government actors encouraged this trend by "categorically
exclud[ing] [disabled children] from public schools."" Against this
backdrop, Congress passed the first iteration of the IDEA, the
EAHCA, in 1975" after the nation acknowledged the damaging
effects systematically excluding students with disabilities from the
education system had on the United States as a whole. 0
Congress's express purpose for passing the 2004 IDEA was to
ensure that every special needs child has access to FAPE "that
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
[the student's] unique needs and prepare [the student] for ...
employment, and independent living."" To support that goal, the
current IDEA places an affirmative obligation on states accepting
federal funds known as "Child Find." This provision requires
participating states to identify and serve "[a]ll children with
disabilities ... who are in need of special education and related
services."4 2  To that end, once a child is suspected of having a
disability, the local educational agency ("LEA")4 3 must ensure that
the student is evaluated in every area in which he is suspected of
37. See Keith Greiner, Comment, Judicial Imprimatur Required: Raising the Standard
for Awards of Attorneys' Fees Under the IDEA in Smith v. Fitchburg Public Schools, 41
NEW ENG. L. REv. 711, 713 (2007) ("At the turn of the twentieth century, 'leading
medical authorities and others began to portray the "feebleminded" as a "menace to
society and civilization ... responsible in a large degree for many, if not all, of our
social problems." (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 462 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))); Justin D.
Kumpulanian, Note, Special Education/Civil Procedure-The IDEA of Fairness: Allowing
Parent-Attorneys to Recover Their Attorneys' Fees Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 31 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 203, 205 (2009) (explaining that, prior to the
1970s, disabled children were denied an equal right to education and systemically
excluded from public school systems).
38. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 462-63 (Marshall, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part) (discussing the extreme nature of the state-mandated segregation
targeted towards the disabled).
39. EAHCA, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
40. See Greiner, supra note 37, at 714-16.
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (A) (2012).
42. Id. § 1412(a) (3) (A) (including in the provision children who are homeless,
who are wards of the state, or who attend private schools).
43. LEAs are responsible for implementing the IDEA's requirements and are
subject to state educational agency ("SEA") oversight. Id. § 1412(a). SEAs receive
and distribute funding available under the IDEA and are also tasked with monitoring
compliance under the Act. Id.
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having a disability." This duty extends to children who are simply
suspected of being in need of special education services and applies
even if the student is advancing from grade to grade.1 5  An LEA is
deemed to have knowledge that the child may have a disability: (1) where
a parent expresses suspicion that her child is a student with a disability;"
(2) when a parent specifically requests that her child be evaluated for
special education services; or (3) when a teacher or other administrative
personnel expresses concerns about the child's behavior."
To be effective, the evaluation of the child suspected of having a
disability must take a holistic approach to addressing the child's needs.4 '
The IDEA mandates that trained evaluators use an assortment of
assessments to glean the proper supports and strategies the child needs
to obtain an appropriate education.o These evaluations must assess any
relevant cognitive, physical, and behavioral factors."
Once it has identified and evaluated the child for services, the
school must provide the child-if he or she is found to be in need of
special education services"-with an individualized education
program ("IEP")." An IEP is a document that identifies the
accommodations, related services ,' and instruction" the child
44. Id. § 1414(b) (3) (B).
45. 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(c) (1) (2014).
46. Parents must express their concerns in writing to supervisory or
administrative personnel or their child's teacher. See20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(B).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Harris v. District of Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. 2008).
50. H.D. ex rel. A.S. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 902 F. Supp. 2d 614, 627 (E.D. Pa.
2012) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)).
51. Id.
52. An intermediate step a school may take before concluding that a student is in
need of special education services-specifically for a student suspected of having
"specific learning disabilities"-is to utilize a method called response to intervention
("RTI"). See § 1414(b) (6); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.307, 300.309, 300.311 (2015) (enabling a
school to use less intrusive instructional interventions to address a child's particular
identified needs); see also U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON RESPONSE
TO INTERVENTION (RTI) AND EARLY INTERVENING SERVICES (EIS) 2, 6 (2007),
http://idea.ed.gov/explore/view/p/%2Croot%2Cdynamic%2CQaCorner%2C8%2C
(discussing how RTIs are used as a tool immediately after a child's special needs are
determined and before deciding if a more specific evaluation and plan is needed).
53. An IEP is a written plan documenting how the school intends to provide the
student with FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d) (1) (A), 1414(d). The IEP must set out
both short-term and long-term goals. Id. § 1414(d).
54. Id. § 1414(d) (1) (A) (i) (VI) (aa).
55. Id. § 1401(26).
56. Id. § 1401(29).
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requires 57 in order to receive meaningful educational benefits .5
Further, it is reasonably calculated to provide a meaningful
educational benefit, the adjudicative standard for FAPE, where:
(1) the program is individualized on the basis of the student's
assessment and performance; (2) the program is administered in the
least restrictive environment; (3) the services are provided in a
coordinated and collaborative manner by the key "stakeholders"; and
(4) positive academic and non-academic benefits are demonstrated."
The IDEA requires a school district to educate disabled students
alongside their non-disabled peers to the greatest practicable
extent." Accordingly, the IDEA obligates schools to establish
procedures that facilitate inclusive learning by providing any aides
and special education services needed to ensure a disabled student's
success,6 ' emphasizing the need for special needs children to have
"access to the general education curriculum in the regular
classroom [] to the maximum extent possible."62
A student's IEP team, which consists of a partnership between
educators and the student's parents," is required to periodically
review the student's IEP, updating it yearly at a minimum. During its
review, the IEP team must determine whether the student is adequately
progressing or whether the team needs to modify the IEP.'
The IDEA has greatly benefitted special education students, but
students with disabilities-particularly those with behavioral needs-
continue to fall behind their peers."
57. 30 C.F.R. § 300.324(b) (1) (i) (2015) (requiring an IEP team to review the child's
IEP at least annually to determine if the child is on track to meet the IEP's goals).
58. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,203-04 (1982) (defining the elements of FAPE).
59. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245,253 (5th Cir. 1997).
60. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); S.H. ex rel. I.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of
Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that students should only be
removed from the general education environment if their disabilities significantly
encumber instruction and only after they were given supplementary aides and
services); OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 19, at 36.
61. See G.B. & L.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist., 751 F. Supp. 2d
552, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
62. § 1400 (c) (5) (emphasis added).
63. An IEP team is a group comprised of the student's parents and teachers, a
curriculum specialist from the local school district and, if requested, a person with
special knowledge or expertise regarding the student, who must collaborate to
develop the student's IEP. Id. § 1414(d) (1) (B).
64. Id.; 30 C.F.R. § 300.324(b) (1) (2015).
65. Marilyn Elias, The School-to-Prison Pipeline: Policies and Practices that Favor
Incarceration Over Education Do Us All A Grave Injustice, TEACHING TOLERANCE, Spring
2013, at 39, 40, http://www.tolerance.org/sites/default/files/general/School-to-
Prison.pdf (demonstrating that students with disabilities are still disproportionately
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2. Zero-tolerance, school resource officers, and jail time
Although the IDEA has ended the systematic exclusion of special
needs students from public schools, these students do not always
receive an adequate education." Bending to societal pressure to
mitigate a perceived increase in school violence," many schools
created systems of behavior management that have been especially
detrimental to students with special needs and have contributed to
the mass incarceration of disabled students.'
Congress included FBAs and BIPs in the IDEA in an effort to
counteract these negative consequences.' Congress's failure to
include proper guidance on when and how to implement the two
techniques, however, has stymied its efforts to support students with
behavioral needs." Without clarification, special education students
continue to fall prey to the school-to-prison pipeline.
The school-to-prison pipeline refers to the relationship between
school suspensions and subsequent incarceration. This term captures
represented in the school-to-prison pipeline and that teachers need increased
classroom support and training to effect the behavior changes needed to keep
students out of the juvenile justice system).
66. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (3)-(4) (finding that although the Act ensures FAPE and
has improved education for students with disabilities, an insufficient focus on
applying proven research methods has resulted in hampered implementation and,
therefore, inadequate education for some).
67. See TONY FABELO ET AL., COUNS. ST. Gov'T JUST. CTR., BREAKING SCHOOLS'
RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF How SCHOOL DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS' SUCCESS
AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 2 (2011) ("Commensurate with the trend to be
'tough on crime' in the late 1980s and early 1990s to increase public safety in the
community (including a focus on perceived 'hardened' juveniles), was a change that
took hold to make schools safer as well.").
68. See TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT, supra note 26, at 9 ("The rise of zero-
tolerance school discipline is directly tied to the law enforcement strategies that have
led to the extraordinary increase in the number of Americans behind bars in recent
years."); Am. Psychol. Ass'n Zero Tolerance Task Force, Are Zero Tolerance Policies
Effective in the Schools? An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCHOL. 852,
854-55 (2008), http://www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/zero-tolerance.pdf
("[S]tudents with disabilities, especially those with emotional and behavioral
disorders, appear to be suspended and expelled at rates disproportionate to their
representation in the population."); see also U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DIsCIPLINE 1 (2014)
[hereinafter DOESNA PSHO T], http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/
crdc-discipline-snapshot.pdf ("With the exception of Latino and Asian-American
students, more than one out of four boys of color with disabilities (served by IDEA)-and
nearly one in five girls of color with disabilities-receives an out-of-school suspension.").
69. Katsiyannis et al., supra note 29, at 331.
70. See discussion infra notes 295-303 and accompanying text (recommending
how and when to most effectively implement FBAs and BlPs).
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anecdotal evidence and supporting data" in one succinct phrase,
explaining that, for many children, school teaches them that they are
"bad."7 2 Thus, a self-fulfilling prophecy begins: students misbehave
and are either incarcerated while still in school or after they leave.
For the last fifteen years, despite evidence that school violence is on the
decline," the number of police officers in schools has increased." The
swell of school resource officers correlates with the amplification of the
"tough on crime" rhetoric from the 1990s" and manifests itself in a
punitive theory of school discipline: zero-tolerance. 6
71. See, e.g., FABELO ETAL., supra note 67, at ix-xiii (discussing a recent study of the effect
of suspensions and expulsions on Texas public school students, and finding-among other
conclusions-that when suspended or expelled, a student's likelihood of becoming
involved in the juvenile justice system significantly increased).
72. This American Life: Is This Working?, CHI. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 17, 2014),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/538/is-this-working
[hereinafter Is This Working?] (explaining that, when "[y]ou suspend a kid, he misses
school, he finds it hard to catch up, he feels frustrated, falls behind. And maybe just as
important, he learns he is bad. Because he feels bad when he's in school, he acts bad").
73. See, e.g., EDUCATION ON LOCKDOwN, supra note 16, at 11 ("[B]etween 1992 and
2002, nationwide violent crimes at schools against students aged [twelve] to
[eighteen] dropped by [fifty percent], and schools remain the safest places for children.
In addition, between 1994 and 2002, the youth arrest rate for violent crimes has declined
[forty-seven percent] nationally." (footnote omitted)); SECURING OUR CHILDREN'SFUTURE:
NEw APPROACHES TO JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 2 (Gary S. Katzmann ed.,
2002) (explaining thatjuvenile violence has decreased since 1993).
74. Jason B. Langberg & Barbara A. Fedders, How Juvenile Defenders Can Help
Dismantle the School-to-Prison Pipeline: A Primer on Educational Advocacy and Incorporating
Clients' Education Histories and Records into Delinquency Representation, 42 J.L. & EDUC.
653, 656 (2013) (explaining that "[a]rmed police officers now can be found in
public schools around the country in drastically increased numbers" and an
estimated "17,000 law enforcement officers-often termed 'school resource officers'
(SROs)-are assigned permanently to schools"); Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource
Officers and the Criminalization of Student Behavior, 37J. CRIM.JUSr. 280, 280-81 (2009)
(estimating that more than 20,000 law enforcement officers are present in schools in
the United States); see also Kristin D. Eisenbraun, Violence in Schools: Prevalence,
Prediction, and Prevention, 12 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 459, 465 (2007)
(referencing a study that suggests that over-dependence on law enforcement in
schools will cause teachers to focus on only students with severe behavioral problems
and students to think that teachers are not authority figures).
75. See FABELO ET AL., supra note 67, at 2 ("Commensurate with the trend to be
'tough on crime' in the late 1980s and early 1990s to increase public safety in the
community (including a focus on perceived 'hardened' juveniles), was a change that
took hold to make schools safer as well.").
76. AM. PSYCHOL. Ass'N ZERO TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, ARE ZERO TOLERANCE PoIscIEs
EFFECnvE IN THE SCHOOLS? AN EVIDENTIARY REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2006),
http://www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/zero-tolerance-report.pdf (explaining that zero-
tolerance policies, which mandate harsh consequences regardless of the gravity or
context of the behavior, gained momentum in schools at the start of the 1990s).
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With the advent of zero-tolerance policies came a drastic increase
in the number of suspensions and expulsions.7 7  Incidents that
traditionally would have been "teachable moments" between teachers
and students now routinely involve police officers.7 ' These once-
minor incidents that, prior to the hyper-policing of students would
not have ended in criminal sanctions, now routinely result in
arrests.79 These policies are particularly exacting for students with
disabilities: although students served by the IDEA represent only
twelve percent of the national school population, students receiving
special education services make up twenty-five percent of those
arrested or referred to law enforcement."o Indeed, one of the best
indicators of whether a student will be suspended from school is his
special education status."' Children who are suspended or expelled
are more likely to be incarcerated as adults." Zero-tolerance policies,
immense police presence, and the use of corporal punishment and
restraint" have exacerbated the mass incarceration of students with
77. See EDUCATION ON LOcKDOwN, supra note 16, at 23 (providing that, following
the implementation of zero-tolerance policies in Denver Public Schools, the number of
suspensions during the 2003-04 school year reached 13,423, up from 9846 during the
2000-01 school year); Langberg & Fedders, supra note 74, at 654-55 (asserting that the
zero-tolerance policies requiring "automatic and often highly severe punishments" for
student offenses dramatically increased incidences of suspensions and expulsions).
78. See JOHANNA WALD & LISA THURAU, CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON INST. FOR
RACE &JUST., FIRST, Do No HARM: How EDUCATORS AND POLICE CAN WORK TOGETHER
MORE EFFECTIVELY TO PRESERVE SCHOOL SAFETY AND PROTECT VULNERABLE STUDENTS 2,
12 (2010); see also EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 16, at 8 (explaining that
Denver Public Schools witnessed a seventy-one percent increase in students referred
to law enforcement, most for non-violent offenses like "bullying and use of
obscenities"); ACLU, TALKING POINTS, supra note 16 (listing offenses for which
students have been arrested, including "throwing an eraser at a teacher, breaking a
pencil, and having rap lyrics in a locker").
79. See Theriot, supra note 74, at 285 (stating that schools with SROs have increased
rates of arrest); see also EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 16, at 13 (describing
students being arrested for nonviolent, "disorderly conduct" and "breach of peace").
80. DOE SNAP SHOT, supra note 68, at 1.
81. See id. (explaining that students with disabilities are suspended more than
twice as often as students without disabilities). During an average school year in the
United States, more than one in every four boys of color with a disability is
suspended. Id. Students, once involved with the juvenile justice system, face several
obstacles in their re-entry to traditional schools. See ACLU, LOCATING THE SCHOOL-
TO-PRISON PIPELINE, supra note 7.
82. Black Preschoolers Far More Likely to Be Suspended, NPR (Mar. 21, 2014, 3:39 PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2014/03/21/29245621 1/black-preschoolers-far-
more-likely-to-be-suspended.
83. Corporal punishment is legal in twenty states and is most often used on
students with disabilities. Maureen Costello, Twenty States Still Use the Paddle,
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disabilities, despite being largely ineffective in enforcing school
discipline." While some districts have begun reconsidering zero
tolerance, many of its vestiges remain, including the presence of
police officers in schools" and the existence of status offenses, such
as truancy, running away, and ungovernability."
Notwithstanding these damaging school discipline policies, the
IDEA and its amendments have been indispensable for disabled
children," and in 1997, "in an attempt to balance school officials'
obligation to ensure that schools are safe and orderly environments that
are conducive to learning and the school's obligation to ensure that
students with disabilities receive [] FAPE,"" Congress amended the Act
to include provisions addressing student misbehavior.o FBAs and BIPs
TEACHING TOLERANCE (May 5, 2010), http://www.tolerance.org/blog/twenty-states-
still-use-paddle; Black Preschoolers Far More Likely to Be Suspended, supra note 82
(explaining that students with disabilities make up three-quarters of all students
restrained at school but only twelve percent of the overall student population).
Generally, this type of discipline takes the form of paddling: "hit[ting a child] on the
buttocks several times with a wooden board resembling a shaved-down baseball bat."
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IMPAIRING EDUCATION: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF STUDENTS
wiTH DISABILITIES IN US PUBuC SCHOOLs 3 (2009) [hereinafter IMPAIRING EDUCATION],
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/humanrights/impairingeducation.pdf.
84. See IMPAIRING EDUCATION, supra note 83, at 4 (asserting that corporal
punishment does not reform students' violent behavior, but makes them more reluctant
to learn and less engaged in school); Deborah N. Archer, Introduction: Challenging the
School-to-Prison Pipeline, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 867, 869 (2009-10) (finding that zero-
tolerance policies demoralize students but do not correct their misbehavior). The use of
these methods should be reformed, but an in-depth analysis of such reforms is beyond
the scope of this paper. For a thoughtful discussion on corporal punishment, see
generally Mary Kate Kearney, Substantive Due Process and Parental Corporal Punishment:
Democracy and the Excluded Child, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1 (1995) and Kathryn R. Urbonya,
Determining Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment: Physical Force to Control and Punish
Students, 10 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 397 (2001).
85. Stephanie Francis Ward, Schools Start to Rethink Zero Tolerance Policies, A.B.A. J.
(Aug. 1, 2014,10:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/schools-start_
torethinkzero tolerance-policies.
86. Id.
87. Joseph B. Tulman & Douglas M. Weck, Shutting Off the School-to-Prison Pipeline
for Status Offenders with Education-Related Disabilities, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 875, 876
n.3, 879 (2009-10) (defining status offenses as offenses that are only criminal
when committed by children, as opposed to delinquency offenses, which are
criminal regardless of age).
88. Katsiyannis et al., supra note 29, at 324 ("The EAHCA... has resulted in numerous
accomplishments and changes in the ways in which we serve students with disabilities.").
89. Id. at 331.
90. See OSBORNE & RUSSO, supra note 19, at 153-54. Although the Supreme Court
addressed school discipline in Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 322-26 (1988), until the
1997 amendments, the IDEA did not include any statutory guidance on the subject.
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aim to prevent and correct student misconduct before it escalates and
results in drastic disciplinary action." Given the impact punitive policies
have had on students with special needs, the added procedural
safeguards these proactive behavior management schemes could
provide are imperative to dismantling the school-to-prison pipeline.
3. BIPs and FBAs: The 1997 and 2004 amendments to the IDEA and the
corresponding regulations
While the 1997 amendments included references to FBAs and
BIPs, the amendments did not expressly require LEAs to monitor
their implementation.92 Indeed, prior to the 2004 amendments, the
IDEA did not contain any LEA requirements regarding the behavior
management programs.93  Thereafter, the 2004 amendments
established that if a school determines a student's misbehavior was a
manifestation of his disability, the school must "conduct a functional
behavioral assessment, and implement a [BIP] for such child."9 4
Where Congress provided more particular guidance, however, was
in the 2004 IDEA's preamble." Here, Congress stressed that the
instruction and related services included in a student's IEP must derive
from "peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable."" Indeed, some
commentators have found these revisions to be "one of the potentially
most significant changes made to IDEA."" Thus, when including
OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 19, at 153-54.
91. See Kevin M. Jones & Katherine F. Wickstrom, Using Functional Assessment to Select
Behavioral Interventions, in PRACICAL HANDBOOK OF SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY: EFFEcHvE
PRACTICESFORTHE21STCENTURY192, 192-93 (Gretchen Gimpel Peacock et al. eds., 2010).
92. See Zirkel, Empirical Analysis, supra note 23, at 185-86.
93. Id. at 185-86.
94. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (k) (1) (F) (i) (2012).
95. Andrea Blau, The IDEA and the Right to an "Appropriate" Education, 2007 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 1, 3-4 (discussing 2004 IDEA's enhanced procedural due process,
accountability, and more precise definitions).
96. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV). In the IDEA context, peer-reviewed
research is defined by an element of the No Child Left Behind Act's ("NCLB")
definition of a similar term-"scientifically based research"-that the IDEA
incorporates by reference. 34 C.F.R. § 300.35 (2007). The Department of Education
has explained that peer-reviewed research "generally refers to research that is
reviewed by qualified and independent reviewers to ensure that the quality of the
information meets the standards of the field before the research is published."
Education Assistance and Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed.
Reg. 46,540, 46,664 (Aug. 14, 2006).
97. BARBARA D. BATEMAN & MARY ANNE LINDEN, BETrER IEPs: How To DEVELOP
LEGALLY CORRECT AND EDUCATIONALLY USEFUL PROGRAMS 63 (2006); see also, Perry A.
Zirkel, Have the Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Razed
Rowley and Raised the Substantive Standard for "Free Appropriate Public Education?", 28 J.
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services and supports in a student's IEP, an IEP team should utilize
effective, peer-reviewed techniques whenever possible.9 8
The 2006 regulations did not provide much clarity on FBAs and
BIPs, reiterating only that if a student with a disability misbehaves and
is suspended, the IEP team must determine whether the behavior was
a manifestation of the child's disability," but only when the
suspension will last more than ten days. 00 Moreover, the regulations
explained that if the IEP team determines the behavior was not a
manifestation of the student's disability, the school may suspend the
student as it would his or her non-disabled peers.o' If, however, the
misbehavior involved weaponsl0 2 or drugs, or the student has
"inflicted serious bodily injury upon another person,"0 ' the school
may suspend the child for "not more than [forty-five] school days
without regard to whether the behavior is determined to be a
manifestation of the child's disability."' Irrespective of the
manifestation determination's outcome, the student must "receive, as
appropriate, a functional behavioral assessment, behavioral intervention
services and modifications, that are designed to address the behavior
violation so that it does not recur."'0 5 The appropriateness of the FBA
and BIP, however, are at the school's discretion. 0 6
NAT'L Ass'N OF ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 397, 410 (2008) [hereinafter Zirkel, Razing
Rowley]. But see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-19
(1981) (holding that congressional findings are precatory and thus, although they
may help in interpreting other provisions, they are not directly enforceable).
98. Education Assistance and Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities,
71 Fed. Reg. at 46,665.
99. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)(i).
100. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.530(e), 300.536 (providing that a removal from school
"for more than [ten] consecutive school days," or "a series of removals" for
substantially similar behavior "tota[ling] more than [ten] school days in a school
year," results in a "change of placement").
101. Id. § 1415(k)(1)(B)-(C).
102. See AM. PSYCHOL. Ass'N ZERO TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 27-28
(observing that a weapon is defined very broadly and at the school's discretion);
OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 19, at 165 (explaining that the IDEA adopts a definition
of "weapon" that is broader than the definition in the Gun-Free Schools Act).
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (1) (G) (i)-(iii).
104. Id. § 1415(k)(1)(G). Should the parent disagree with the suspension, the
parent can file for a so-called "stay put," which triggers a due process hearing and
requires that the student remain in his present placement while appeals are pending, see
id. § 1415(f)(1) (A), unless the parent agrees with the new placement or the hearing
officer determines that keeping the child in his current placement is "substantially likely
to result in injury to the child or to others." See id. §§ 1415(j), 1415(k) (3) (a).
105. Id. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii) (emphasis added); see cf U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON DISCIPLINE PROCEDURES 14 (2009),
489
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Although BIPs and FBAs are federally mandated requirements,10 7
and it is clear that disregarding behavioral issues is a denial of
FAPE,'0 o there is no clear guidance as to whether a student with
behavioral needs must have an FBA or a BIP or what either must
include.'" The IDEA's lack of guidance has resulted in inconsistent
and often contradictory court rulings, and the lack of specific
definitions and procedures has allowed schools to develop
purportedly legal but substantively deficient behavior evaluations and
intervention plans for special needs students.n"0
4. Generally accepted definitions ofFBAs and BlPs
When Congress initially included FBAs and BIPs in the IDEA, many
practitioners were unaware of how school districts were supposed to
use them.'" In 1997, while FBAs were not a new concept among
education scholars,"'2 educators themselves did not commonly use
them in practice."' This knowledge gap, in large part, led to a lack
of uniform application of FBAs and BIPs in the field of special
http://idea.ed.gov/explore/view/p/%2Croot%2Cdynamic%2CQaCorner%2C7%2
C (explaining that the 2006 regulations require that LEAs conduct both an FBA and a
BIP only after the conduct is determined to have been a manifestation of the child's
disability and the child will have a change in placement, but that under the regulations,
schools may conduct an FBA and BIP if the IEP team deems it appropriate for the child).
106. Assuming that the corresponding state has not promulgated substantive
requirements for FBAs or BIPs.
107. But see Education Assistance and Preschool Grants for Children with
Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,629 (Aug. 14, 2006) (stating that FBAs and BIPs
"are not required components of an IEP" unless state law provides otherwise).
108. It is, however, unclear how meaningfully the IEP team must address a
student's misbehavior for a hearing officer or court to find the school had provided
FAPE. See id.; Losinski et al., supra note 20, at 252.
109. See Losinski et al., supra note 20, at 253; see also Alex R. ex rel Beth R. v.
Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating
that neither Congress nor the U.S. Department of Education created requirements
for BIPs). As previously mentioned, the words as necessary also add to the confusion
of when an FBA or BIP must be conducted.
110. Maag, supra note 35, at 356; see Losinski et al., supra note 20, at 252 (contrasting
two New York state court decisions reaching opposite conclusions about whether failing
to provide an FBA to a student with disabilities constituted a denial of FAPE).
111. Kimberly P. Weber et al., The Status of Functional Behavioral Assessment (FBA):
Adherence to Standard Practice in FBA Methodology, 42 PSYCHOL. IN THE Scus. 737, 738 (2005).
112. See Frank M. Gresham et al., Methodological Issues in Functional Analysis:
Generalizability to Other Disability Groups, 24 BEHAv. DISORDERs 180, 180 (1999)
(explaining that much of the research on functional analysis and assessment
performed prior to 1997 was conducted outside of school settings).
113. See Nelson, supra note 30, at 170.
490 [Vol. 65:471
2015] THE ROAD TO PRISON IS PAVED WITH BAD EVALUATIONS
education.' Schools knew neither when to implement these
behavior interventions nor what they needed to include if such
behavior techniques were needed." 5 The IDEA's 1997 amendments
were a catalyst for the literature and teacher-training courses
regarding FBAs and BIPs."` Currently, there is a generally accepted
definition of both FBAs and BIPs amongst education scholars
presumably because Congress included the term in the 1997 statute."'
While special educators generally agree on the definitions of FBAs
and BIPs, courts and other educational stakeholders have struggled
to determine whether the failure to implement either scheme violates
Rowley's standard for providing FAPE.
B. Defining FAPE: The Rowley Standard
In 1982, seven years after Congress passed the first iteration of the
IDEA, the Supreme Court interpreted the adjudicative standard for
FAPE, finding that a school must provide each special education student
with a "basic floor of opportunity.""' To determine whether a school has
provided a student with that opportunity, the Court announced a two-
prong test, evaluating whether a school's failure to adhere to the IDEA's
procedural requirements resulted in a loss of educational benefit.
1. Enabling children to achieve passing marks
In 1980, the parents of a deaf kindergartener alleged that the
school's failure to provide their child with a sign-language interpreter
constituted a denial of FAPE. 2 o The trial court's ruling in favor of
114. See id. at 169-70; see also Heidi von Ravensberg & TaryJ. Tobin, IDEA 2004:
The Reauthorized FBA 3 (June 25, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 151394.
115. See Nelson, supra note 30, at 169-70, 173-74; Cynthia A. Dieterich &
Christine J. Villani, Functional Behavioral Assessment: Process Without Procedure,
2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 209, 218-19.
116. See Dieterich &Villani, supra note 115, at 218-19; cf von Ravensberg &Tobin, supra
note 114, at 3 (explaining that unfamiliarity with FBAs created a knowledge gap).
117. See von Ravensberg & Tobin, supra note 114, at 3 (explaining that, following the
passage of the 1997 IDEA, school and legal administrators who lacked familiarity with
behavioral concepts had to "play[] catch-up" to determine how to incorporate FBAs into a
school setting); see also Dieterich & Villani, supra note 115, at 209-10 (explaining that after
the 1997 Amendments, school districts were left with more questions than answers).
118. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200-01 (1982).
119. Id. at 206-07 (holding that a state meets its obligations under the Act when it
has "complied with the procedures set forth in the Act" and when its "individualized
educational program developed through the Act's procedures [is] reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits").
120. Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), afd per curiam, 632
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the child's parents found that FAPE required disabled children to
have the "opportunity to achieve [their] full potential commensurate
with the opportunity provided to other children,"' 2 ' a standard that the
appellate court affirmed.1 22  Overturning the judgment of the lower
courts and finding that the student was adequately progressing without
the assistance of an interpreter, the Court held that a school has
provided FAPE to a child when services are "reasonably calculated to
enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to
grade"' 2 -- a standard much lower than one requiring a school to foster
a child's full potential.12 In so concluding, the Court relied heavily on
the Act's findings section,2 2 determining that a substantive standard
for FAPE was "[i]mplicit in the congressional purpose of providing access
to a 'free appropriate public education.""2 ' Determining that the lower
courts had erred in requiring schools to maximize educational benefits
for special needs students, the Court reasoned that
the Act was designed to ... provide a "basic floor of opportunity"
consistent with equal protection[, but that] neither the Act nor its
history persuasively demonstrates that Congress thought that equal
protection required anything more than equal access. Therefore,
Congress' [s] desire to provide specialized educational services,
even in furtherance of "equality," cannot be read as imposing any
particular substantive educational standard upon the States.'
Although the Court found that Congress's definition of FAPE was
"cryptic," it nevertheless derived a definition based on Congress's
stated intent and the words of the IDEA itself.'12  Thus, Rowley
F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'4, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
121. Id. at 534.
122. Rowley, 632 F.2d at 945.
123. Rowley, 485 U.S. at 204.
124. See id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting that, for the plaintiff, "a
teacher with a loud voice" would satisfy the Court's standard (citations omitted)).
But see id. at 211-12 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (countering that the school board
provided the student "more than 'a teacher with a loud voice"' and stating that the
relevant inquiry is whether the student's IEP "offered her an educational opportunity
substantially equal to that provided her non-handicapped classmates") (citations omitted)).
125. Id. at 192 ("By passing the Act, Congress sought primarily to make public
education available to handicapped children."). Since the Court's 1982 holding in
Rowley, Congress has amended the IDEA and added more specific language to the
IDEA's findings section. This heightened language may have led to a heightened
standard for evaluations of FAPE. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing how some courts
have found that the lack of an FBA and a BIP denies students FAPE).
126. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 188-89.
492 [Vol. 65:471
20151 THE ROAD TO PRISON IS PAVED WITH BAD EVALUATIONS
announced a two-prong evaluation for IDEA fulfillment: (1) did the
school comply with the Act's procedural mandates, and (2) is the IEP
likely to provide the student with "some educational benefit"?'"2
Congress has since codified these substantive requirements of
FAPE,s0 including both prongs of Rowley and a third element
addressing parents' right to be involved in a child's education.' 3 '
These provisions established that a school has not denied FAPE to a
student who is receiving "some educational benefit,"'1 2 even if the
school has committed a procedural violation of the IDEA.'"
Seemingly in response to the Court's interpretation of FAPE as one
of equal access rather than equal opportunity, Congress amended the
IDEA's findings section, reasoning that "the implementation of [the
IDEA] ha[d] been impeded by... an insufficient focus on applying
replicable research on proven methods of teaching and learning for
children with disabilities.""' Many commentators have interpreted
this revision as raising the bar for what constitutes FAPE.1 5  In
129. Id. at 200, 206-07.
130. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (3) (E) (ii) (2012).
131. Id. § 1415(f) (3) (E)(ii) (II) (providing that a "hearing officer may find that a
child did not receive a [FAPE] only if the procedural inadequacies ... significantly
impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process
regarding the provision of a [FAPE] to the parents' child").
132. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200 (finding that the standard of "confer[ring] some
educational benefit" is implicit in Congress's purpose of providing FAPE to
students with disabilities).
133. See infra Part II.B.2 (explaining that to comply with procedures established in
the IDEA, a school must evaluate every student suspected of having a disability,
create a responsive IEP, and provide support so the student may learn alongside non-
disabled peers in the general education classroom).
134. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (4).
135. See, e.g., Philip T.K. Daniel & Jill Meinhardt, Valuing the Education of Students
with Disabilities: Has Government Legislation Caused a Reinterpretation ofA Free Appropriate
Public Education?, 222 EDUC. L. REP. 515, 531 (2007) (arguing that the 1997
amendments heightened the IDEA's standards from "merely provid [ing] students
with access to an education" to "requir[ing] results and academic achievement");
Tara L. Eyer, Commentary, Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise
the Basic Floor of Opportunity for Children with Disabilities, 126 EDUc. L. REP. 1, 17 (1998)
(concluding that the 1997 amendments "suggest that the Rowley standard should be
preserved, but that the 'basic floor of opportunity' has been elevated from access to
meaningful progress" (citations omitted)); Mitchell L. Yell et al., Reflections on the 25th
Anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Board of Education v. Rowley, 39
Focus ON EXcEPTIONAL CHILD. 1, 8-9 (2007) (arguing that the amendments to the
IDEA will cause a "fundamental alteration in the ways in which the courts view []
FAPE"); DIXIE SNOW HUEFNER, GETTING COMFORTABLE WYTH SPEcIAL EDUCATION LAW: A
FRAMEWORK FOR WORKING WrT CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIEs 252 (2006) (predicting that
the requirement of "meaningful progress" will become the new standard for FAPE).
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support of their views, commentators point to the text of the IDEA,
which incorporates No Child Left Behind's ("NCLB") "adequate
yearly progress" provision,136 stresses the importance of self-sufficiency,
and emphasizes that designed instruction and related services be based
on "peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable."13 7 In amending
the IDEA, moreover, Congress underscored the need to maximize a
disabled child's inclusion in the general education
classroom.'"3 Indeed, since Rowley, lower courts have retreated from
the Court's seemingly deflated standard for FAPE. 39
2. Deprivation of educational opportunity versus a mere technical
contravention of the 1DEA
The Rowley test requires that a court first find a substantive flouting
of the IDEA before concluding that a school's actions denied a
student FAPE. In making this evaluation, a court considers whether
the IEP complies with the IDEA's procedural requirements and
whether, at the time the IEP was written, it was reasonably calculated
to confer educational benefits.
An adequate IEP must respond to the child's strengths; the
guardian's concerns; the results of any evaluations; the child's
academic, developmental, and functional needs; and, where the
behavior impedes the child's learning and that of others, "the use of
positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies,
to address that behavior.""' The reviewing court must analyze
whether the IEP was appropriate at the time it was written, rather
than whether the plan actually conferred an educational benefit."'
To allege deficiencies in an IEP, educational rights-holders' 2 must
file a due process complaint."'3 When a school does violate the IDEA,
136. See Zirkel, Razing Rowley, supra note 97, at 405.
137. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (2012); see supra notes 95-98 and
accompanying text.
138. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (5).
139. See Weber, supra note 4, at 434-36. Weber contends that this raised standard
of Rowley may be predicated on the fact that Amy Rowley, the hearing-disabled
plaintiff in the case, was not as severely or intellectually disabled as many of the
children served by the IDEA. Id. at 379-86.
140. Sch. Bd. v. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928, 941 (E.D. Va. 2010) (quoting 20
U.S.C. § 1414 (d) (3) (B) (i)).
141. OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 19, at 35.
142. Until children reach the age of the majority (as determined by state law), their
legal guardians hold their educational rights. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.520(a)-(b) (2015).
143. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(7) (A). Parents often seek various kinds of relief,
including compensatory education, changes in placement, and private school tuition
reimbursement. Though the kind of relief the educational rights-holder seeks is
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the reviewing body must look to whether the school's conduct was
merely a technical contravention of the IDEA's procedural
requirements or whether its action directly caused the student's
deprivation of educational opportunity."' In its examination, a court
must first determine whether the LEA complied with the procedures
set forth in the IDEA.14 5
C. Applying Rowley's First Prong to FBAs and BIPs: Procedural
Requirements Within the IDEA and Enforcement Mechanisms-When a
School Must Provide a Student with an FBA and BIP
With little guidance, courts continue to grapple with the
procedural elements of FBAs and BIPs and whether the failure to
implement either is a denial of FAPE.'4 1 While it is clear that
disciplinary changes in placement-such as a suspension lasting ten
or more school days"'-trigger FBAs and BIPs, it is unclear whether a
student who has not yet incurred a change in placement"' is similarly
required to have an FBA or a BIP.
crucial to a court's evaluation of the merits, this Comment focuses solely on whether a
school's failure to conduct an FBA and implement a BIP is a relevant consideration when
evaluating whether a school has provided a child with FAPE. Thereafter, under the
IDEA, any party dissatisfied by an administrative decision "shall have the right to bring a
civil action ... in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the
United States, without regard to the amount in controversy." Id. § 1415(i) (2) (A).
144. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203-04 (1982) (detailing the elements
of FAPE); C.H. ex rel. Hayes v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 68 (3d Cir.
2010) (explaining that whether a school deprived a student of educational
opportunity requires an evaluation of the case's particular circumstances).
145. This is Rowley's first prong. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07.
146. See Dennis Fan, Note, No IDEA What the Future Holds: The Retrospective Evidence
Dilemma, 114 COLUM. L. REv. 1503, 1505 (2014); Jeffrey A. Knight, Comment, When
Close Enough Doesn't Cut It: Why Courts Should Want to Steer Clear of Determining What
Is-and What Is Not-Material in a Child's Individual Education Program, 41 U. TOL. L.
REV. 375, 375 (2010) ("As a relatively new field, special-education law is terrain not
yet fully explored."). Compare Alex R. ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit.
Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 609, 611, 618 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the student-
plaintiff was not denied FAPE because his IEPs were tailored to his needs each year
and allowed him to progress from grade to grade), with Banks v. District of
Columbia, 720 F. Supp. 2d 83, 92 (holding that the record was insufficient to
determine whether the school's implementation of only some services in the
student's IEP constituted a denial of FAPE), and Long v. District of Columbia, 780 F.
Supp. 2d 49, 59-61 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that the school's failure to complete a
BIP and FBA was a denial of FAPE).
147. 34 C.F.R. § 300.536(a) (2008).
148. OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 19, at 137 (arguing that determining "whether
a change is likely to affect a student's learning in a significant way" is an important
factor when evaluating whether a change in placement has occurred).
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1. Disciplinary changes in placement
Courts agree that when a school disciplines students with
disabilities by removing them from their current placements for ten
school days or more, it must conduct an FBA and implement a BIP or
update them if they already exist."' Although courts generally agree
that in this situation schools are required to conduct an FBA and
implement a BIP, courts have diverged on whether a school's failure
to do so constitutes a denial of FAPE. `0
2. 1Wen a student's behavior deprives him of educational benefits
A more contentious issue arises when a school has not yet
suspended the student. In this instance, the IEP team must consider
conducting an FBA when a child's behavior impedes his or her
classmate's learning and when an IEP team has a reason to believe
that a student is likely to have behavioral issues.'"' The 1997
amendments also allowed an IEP team to "consider" conducting an
FBA or implementing a BIP "when appropriate."' The 2004
amendments removed the "when appropriate" language but left the
requirement that schools only "consider" the strategies,15 3 "[t]he
operant verb [being 'consider',] not 'to develop or implement,'
and-more importantly-the object[] [being] interventions,
supports, and strategies, not specifically FBAs or BIPs."'15  This lack of
guidance has led to a notable divide in court rulings applying it.
D. Rowley's Second Prong: A judiciary Divided
Courts agree that if a school's response to a student's learning
disabilities does not meet Rowley's second prong, the school has
deprived that student of FAPE.'15  While a court may invalidate an
IEP that blatantly disregards the IDEA's basic requirements, it must
also look to whether these procedural errors have deprived the
149. See Alex R., 375 F.3d at 614; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (1) (D) (ii); 34 C.F.R. §
300.530(f)(1) (2012). If, however, after a manifestation determination, the IEP team
concludes the misbehavior was not due to the student's disability, the team must only
consider FBAs and BIPs to reduce the recurrence of the misbehavior. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(k) (1) (D) (ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(c), (d) (ii).
150. See, e.g., Maag & Katsiyannis, supra note 35, at 348, 352. See generally Bon &
Osborne, supra note 20.
151. 34 C.F.R. pt. 300 app. A, at 115 (2004).
152. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-17 § 614(d) (3) (B) (i), 111 Stat. 37, 86.
153. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (3) (B) (i).
154. Zirkel, Empirical Analysis, supra, note 23, at 186.
155. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982).
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student of an educational benefit.'" Much of the case law regarding
FBAs and BIPs revolves around access to education in the absence of
an FBA or a BIP, the FBA's or BIP's appropriateness, and its
implementation.'1 7 In his 2011 study, Perry A. Zirkel, professor of law
and education at Lehigh University, found that from 1998-2010,
courts heard 173 cases involving FBAs, BIPs, or both.' Professor
Zirkel's study revealed that hearing officers tended to rule on a
"rather ad hoc and often cryptic [basis], explicitly or implicitly
[relying] on the evidence in the case, whereas the courts tended to
cite and apply the standard under the IDEA, or if there was one, the
standard under state law . . . [and] tended to be much stricter."'59
Moreover, some adjudicators found that the Rowley standard should
apply, while others did not even mention it, resulting in a standard
that "was not at all clear."'
1. Courts finding that the lack of an FBA and a BIP is a denial ofFAPE
Despite the IDEA's uncertainty, several courts have found that the
lack of an FBA and BIP for a student with behavioral needs denies
that student FAPE. In School Board v. Brown,"' the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia held that a school failed to provide
a student with FAPE when school personnel did not conduct an FBA
or implement a BIP after "several behavioral incidents."'62 The court
noted that the student's repeated misconduct "placed the School
Board on notice that [the] Student's current disability .. . warranted
a[n FBA].""' Notwithstanding the IDEA's "consider" language, the
court found that the school's failure to conduct an FBA violated the
school's responsibilities under the Child Find'" component of the
Act.165 Noting that the student's lack of a behavioral evaluation and
156. See OSBORNE& Russo, supra note 19, at 100.
157. See Zirkel, Empirical Analysis, supra, note 23, at 191-92.
158. Id. at 196 (stating that hearing or review officers heard 125 cases while courts
heard the remaining forty-eight).
159. Id. at 202.
160. Id. at 203.
161. 769 F. Supp. 2d 928 (E.D. Va. 2010).
162. Id. at 934, 943 (explaining that the student left three threatening messages
on the principal's voicemail).
163. Id. at 943.
164. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B) (requiring that the LEA ensure that "the child is
assessed in all areas of suspected disability"); see discussion infra notes 226-79 (arguing that
schools must evaluate the child in every suspected area of disability, including behavior).
165. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 943. This reasoning has also persuaded courts in
New York, which, relying on the IDEA's plain language, found that a school was
required to provide an autistic child who was hyperactive and easily distracted with
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an intervention plan led to his suspension and loss of educational
benefit, the court found the school had denied the student FAPE.'"
Similarly relying on the school's Child Find obligations, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia held in Long v. District of
Columbia'17 that because teachers observed a decline in the student's
behavior and did not conduct an FBA or implement a BIP, the
student was denied FAPE.I" Each court found that the student's
behavior substantially affected his academic performance and that
the school's failure to evaluate and address the student constituted a
procedural and substantive violation of the IDEA.'"9
2. Courts jinding that the lack of an FBA and a BIP is not a denial ofFAPE
In contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Seventh,
and Eighth Circuits have found that a school's failure to provide a
student with behavioral needs with an FBA and a BIP is not a denial
of FAPE.170 In Park Hill School District v. Dass,'7 1 the Eighth Circuit
acknowledged that it "typically" reviewed an IEP prospectively.'72 In
Dass, however, the court found that such an evaluation would be
unwarranted, given that the school, after the parents filed their due
process complaint, had the opportunity to address the problem.' 73
The court reasoned that because school district representatives
acknowledged that the student had behavioral needs and testified
an FBA, despite the "consider" language. C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.,
746 F.3d 68, 73, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2014). But see M.W. ex ret. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of
Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that the failure to conduct an FBA
does not invalidate an IEP, as long as an adequate BIP is included).
166. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 943, 945.
167. 780 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2011).
168. Id. at 59-61.
169. Id. at 61; Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 943, 945; see also Student v. Redlands
Unified Sch. Dist., Off. Admin. Hearings, Special Educ. Division, Case Nos.
N2006100159, N2007031009 (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/
oah/sehodecisions/2006100159-2007031009.pdf. Here, the California State
Educational Agency found that the school district committed a procedural violation
when it failed to provide an autistic student with an FBA and positive BIP. Id. at 29.
The court ultimately concluded that the procedural violation amounted to a
substantive denial of FAPE because the deprivation divested the student of an
educational benefit, even though the school implemented other unsuccessful
behavior interventions. Id.
170. M.W ex rel. S.W., 725 F.3d at 140; Park Hill Sch. Dist. v. Dass, 655 F.3d 762,
764 (8th Cir. 2011); Alex R. ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit. Sch. Dist,
375 F.3d 603, 618 (7th Cir. 2004).
171. 655 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2011).
172. Id. at 767.
173. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (1) (B) (i) (IV)).
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during the administrative hearing that the school planned to use
behavior intervention strategies that had been successful for other
autistic students, the absence of a plan to address the student's
challenge behavior was merely a procedural violation of the IDEA.'14
Similarly, in School Board of Independent School District No. 11 v.
Renollett,"' the Eighth Circuit found that a BIP does not need to be in
writing for it to be sufficient.' 7 6
The Second Circuit, which is somewhat consistent with the Eighth
Circuit in this particular instance, has held that when the IEP
identifies the student's behavioral issues and creates strategies to
prevent that behavior, an FBA is not required."' In the Second Circuit's
estimation, the lack of a written FBA does not prevent "meaningful
decision[ ]making" when creating an IEP." The Seventh Circuit used
slightly different reasoning to come to a similar conclusion, declaring
that it "may not create out of whole cloth" substantive requirements for a
BIP, and concluding that a BIP cannot "fall [] short of substantive
criteria that do not exist," and thus a school's failure to implement one
cannot constitute a denial of FAPE."'
3. Deference to administrative determinations of the facts
Despite the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, however, "[m]any statutes
leave key terms ambiguous, often intentionally, and thereby delegate
rulemaking authority to [the] courts."'s Several courts-including
the Supreme Court-have been tasked with exploring the elements
174. Id. (reasoning that "requesting a due process hearing [puts] the school
district on notice of a perceived problem," but by contemplating behavior
intervention strategies, the school already had notice).
175. 440 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2006).
176. Id. at 1011 (noting that "neither [state law] nor federal law require a written BIP").
177. M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 2013).
178. Id.
179. Alex R. ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit. Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d
603, 615 (7th Cir. 2004); see Renolett, 440 F.3d at 1011 ("Although the parties
intended to attach a written BIP to [the student's] IEP, neither Minnesota nor
federal law require a written BIP."); Bon & Osborne, supra note 20, at 582 (reviewing
the litigation and noting that some circuits have held that failing to implement a BIP
does not constitute a denial of FAPE). But see Zirkel, Empirical Analysis, supra note 23,
at 177 (noting that "since Rowley, the Supreme Court has addressed various other
IDEA issues, but not FBAs or BIPs, and Congress has codified a modified procedural
standard for FAPE." (footnotes omitted)).
180. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC PoLIcY 832 (4th ed. 2012).
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of undefined terms within statutes and have, through that process,
created substantive elements of those terms. 181
With the exception of matters of law, judges must give deference to
hearing officer determinations.'" Like many other federal statutes,
the IDEA "points out a mode of procedure which must be followed
before there can be a resort to the courts."'83  Thus, the
administrative process serves as a "preliminary sifting process"' done
by persons with expert knowledge who are better equipped to deal
with the subject's technical complexity,"' and "by no means [should]
courts ... substitute their own notions of sound educational policy"
for those of the experts.' Instead, "the appropriate level of
review ... [is] 'involved oversight,' a standard which 'falls somewhere
between the highly deferential clear-error standard and the non-
deferential de novo standard."""' With these provisions in mind,
courts determining the sufficiency of FBAs and BIPs routinely defer
to the testimony presented in the administrative record.'"
Although courts remain in conflict in determining whether the
failure to provide a student with an FBA and BIP is a denial of FAPE,
looking collectively to the administrative record, expert testimony,
and the IDEA's stated purpose and procedural requirements provides
courts with a coherent way to determine the sufficiency of a school's
response to a student with behavioral needs. Ultimately, when a
special education student puts a school on notice that he or she is a
181. See generally, e.g., Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014)
(determining whether screening procedures were an "integral" part of job); Solid
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)
(interpreting the term "navigable waters"); United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (defining "waters of the United States").
182. A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 172-73 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
that deference was "particularly warranted" because the district court based its
decision only on the administrative record); Bd. of Educ. v. Benton, 406 F. Supp. 2d
1248, 1269-70 (S.D. Ala. 2005) (explaining that the hearing officer's conclusion
"does not constitute improper second-guessing"); OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 19,
at 168 (noting several cases in which the court agreed with the hearing officer).
183. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 167 (1904) (explaining that to act
substantively on the statute at issue, a question of procedure had to be addressed
first-similar to the IDEA); see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (explaining that an
aggrieved party may bring a civil suit in a federal court).
184. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. at 170.
185. Raoul Berger, Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies, 48 YALE L.J. 981, 984 (1939).
186. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
187. S. Kingston Sch. Comm. v.Joanna S. ex rel. PJ.S., 773 F.3d 344, 349 (1st Cir. 2014)
(quoting Sebastian M. v. King Phillip Reg'1 Sch. Dist, 685 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2012)).
188. See, e.g., C.F. exrel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep'tof Educ., 746 F.3d 68,80 (2d Cir. 2014).
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student whose behavior impedes his or her access to education,
schools must respond with an FBA and BIP.'"
II. A SCHOOL'S FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN FBA AND IMPLEMENT A BIP
FOR A STUDENT WITH SPECIAL NEEDS IS A DENIAL OF FAPE
The IDEA requires that an IEP team create an IEP that is uniquely
tailored to address the specific needs of the student. 0` An IEP's
adequacy is judged not on a standard of actual benefit, but rather on
whether it is likely to confer on the student a meaningful educational
benefit at the time it is written.' To fulfill these obligations, a
school must first evaluate a student in every area of suspected
disability using peer-reviewed techniques and then use the results of
those evaluations to create the student's IEP. "' This requires the use
of an FBA and a BIP for a student with demonstrated behavioral
challenges. The IEP must also ensure that the student is educated
with his nondisabled peers to the greatest extent possible.'" When a
student's behavior frequently causes him or her to be removed from
the classroom, the school must address it.
Ultimately, the IEP team for a student with behavioral needs must, at
a minimum, identify his problem behaviors and create an intervention
plan that addresses those specific behaviors. A one-size-fits-all behavioral
intervention, without evidence that the intervention will actually support
the child's behavioral needs, does not fulfill this obligation.
A. Regardless of What it Is Called, a School's Failure to Evaluate the Function
of a Student's Misbehavior and Subsequently Implement a Plan Reasonably
Calculated to Intervene in the Child's Misbehavior Results in a Denial ofFAPE
A school's use of a peer-reviewed technique to assess the function
of a student's misbehavior, whether or not it is called an FBA, satisfies
the IDEA's procedural requirements. Similarly, a school's
reasonably-calculated plan to address and correct a student's
misbehavior, whether or not it is formalized in a written BIP,
complies with the Act. Many of the courts that have held that a
school's failure to implement an FBA and a BIP did not result in the
denial of FAPE relied primarily on the fact that the school, despite
189. See discussion infra Part II.A.
190. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (A) (2012); Bd. of Educ. v. Benton, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1248,
1268 (S.D. Al. 2005) (noting that the IEP "should be designed specifically for [the student]").
191. See OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 19, at 35.
192. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b) (3) (B).
193. See id. § 1400(c) (5) (A).
501
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
not calling the process FBA and BIP, attempted to understand the
function of the student's misbehavior and created a plan that was
reasonably designed to interrupt those misbehaviors.'"
1. Would a rose by any other name smell as sweet? Using FBAs and BI's or
their substantive equivalents when evaluating and addressing behavior
So long as a school attempts to determine the root causes of a
student's misbehavior using peer-reviewed procedures and creates a
plan that aims at mitigating those behaviors, the school's action is not
a per se denial of FAPE simply because it did not refer to this process
as conducting an "FBA" and implementing a "BIP." The IDEA
provides that when a student's misbehavior leads to suspension, the
school must identify the function of the misbehavior and create a
corrective action plan.'
Although the IDEA does not define FBA and BIP, it sets a low bar
procedural requirement for using an FBA to create a BIP: so long as
the BIP does not become deficient in the absence of an FBA, no
substantive violation occurs. When a school does not conduct an
FBA, however, a reviewing court must take "particular care" in
deciding whether the IEP adequately addresses the child's problem
behaviors.'" An "IEP [that does not] adequately identifjy the]
student's behavioral impediments and implement[] strategies to
address that behavior" constitutes a substantive violation.'9 7
An evaluation that follows those guidelines, however, appears to be
an FBA in spirit, if not in name. For example, courts that have found
a school's failure to create an IEP that incorporates data from an FBA
did not deny the student FAPE-including the Seventh Circuit in Alex
R. ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Community Unit School District'" and
the Second Circuit in M. W ex rel. S. W v. New York City Department of
Education'"-based their conclusions on findings that the school
utilized other means to discern the causes of the student's
misbehavior and created a BIP or an IEP in accordance with those
194. See, e.g., Alex R. ex rel. Beth R v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d
603, 609, 611, 613 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing that officials did not act in good faith
when they considered a student's disability and its associated effects on the classroom).
195. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii); 34C.F.R. § 300.530(f)(1).
196. R.E. ex rel.J.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 190 (2d Cir. 2012).
197. M.W. ex rel S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 2013).
198. 375 F.3d 603, 613-14 (7th Cir. 2004).
199. 725 F.3d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that a BIP describing the
student's "behaviors that interfered with learning" based on reports and in-class
observations was sufficient).
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findings 20 : the functional equivalent of conducting an FBA. 20 ' Thus,
the school's failure to refer to the system of behavior evaluation used
when creating a BIP as specifically an FBA is not a per se denial of
FAPE; rather, the failure to offer adequate equivalent benefits denies
a student with behavioral needs FAPE.2 o2 Similarly, a plan that does
not consider and address the root causes of a student's misbehaviors
violates the IDEA, as it does not consider the unique needs of the
child." When a child has behavioral issues, a plan must address
those needs to ensure FAPE, regardless of its name.204
The Second Circuit applied similar reasoning when it held in M. W
ex rel. S.W. that a BIP may be incorporated in a child's IEP.205 if a
school creates a BIP within the IEP, instead of in a separate
document, it has created a plan to intervene in a child's misbehaviors
and thus complies with the IDEA's requirements. 206 In M. W ex rel.
S. W, the court, by concluding that the IEP created a plan that would
likely intervene in the student's behavior, determined that the IEP not
only created benchmarks, but that it also established a plan that allowed
for collaboration between the IEP team and teachers and included .the
methods by which these stakeholders would implement it.207
200. See id. at 140-41; C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 74, 80
(2d Cir. 2014) (concluding that a BIP based on "McCarton reports," which identified
the student's behavior impediments and their causes, might have provided the
student FAPE if the behavioral strategies were adequately created and implemented);
A.C. ex rel M.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 170, 172-73 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
that supplying the student with a personal aide was an appropriate substitute for an
FBA); D.N. ex rel. G.N. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 14 Civ. 2526, 2015 WL 925968, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2015) (stating that "in devising the BIP, the CSE considered
numerous behavioral reports," and "the resulting BIP... identifie[d the student's]
behavioral challenges and suggest[ed] detailed methods to address those
challenges"). But see Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. v. T.S. ex rel. RS., 893 F. Supp. 2d 643,
651 (D. Del. 2012) (finding that the school's omission of baseline historical data-i.e., the
student's previously mastered skills-from the IEP did not deny the student FAPE).
201. See discussion supra Part I.F.
202. R.IL ex rel. R.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 09-CV-4478, 2011 WL 1131492,
at *19 (E.D.N.Y.Jan. 21, 2011), aff'd, 694 F.3d 167 (2nd Cir. 2012) (explaining that a
plan should do more than "[m]erely describ[e] problematic behavior and lis[t] several
goals for improvement" to be a sufficient substitute for an FBA and/or a BIP).
203. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (A) (2012); Sch. Bd. v. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928, 945
(E.D. Va. 2010) (holding that because the student's IEP was not "specially designed to meet
[his] unique needs with regard to his behavioral issues," the school denied FAPE).
204. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b) (3) (B); Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
205. 725 F.3d 131, 140, 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2013).
206. Compliance is achieved so long as the IEP details strategies for intervention
and notjust benchmarks.
207. 725 F.3d at 141.
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In Park Hill School District v. Dass,' the Eighth Circuit failed to
consider these elements of the IDEA when it summarily reversed the
judgments of the administrative hearing officer and district court
below.209 Although it is true that a school district has the opportunity
to address parents' complaints, this provision should only affect the
court's analysis if the district actually took the opportunity to remedy
the issue. In this case, the district merely testified that it planned on
using strategies that worked with other students who were also
autistic, thus both failing to have an actual, written plan in place and
to address the unique needs of the child-not all autistic children are
alike.2"o The Eighth Circuit's precedent tests the validity of that
statement and ignores the clear requirements of the IDEA.
B. When a Child's Behavior Impedes Access to Education, the School Is
Required to Conduct an FBA and Implement a Positive BIP
When a child's behavior deprives him of an educational benefit,
thus violating Rowley's standard for FAPE, the school must evaluate
(or reevaluate) the misbehavior's causes and create a plan that is likely
to support the student's behavioral needs and confer an educational
benefit. The IDEA's "most fundamental concern" is ensuring that each
special needs student obtains a quality education.' Part of that goal
requires that schools use "positive behavioral interventions to address
the conduct of children with disabilities that impedes their learning
or that of others in the classroom.""'
School officials cannot ignore a suspicion that a child may have a
disability."' Delays in evaluating a student can result in a denial of
FAPE"' and drastically lower educational outcomes for disabled
208. 655 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2011).
209. Id. at 766-69 (holding that the lack of provisions in an IEP addressing
behavioral and transition issues constituted "at most a procedural, not a substantive
error" and did not deny the child FAPE).
210. See AmandaJ. ex rel. AnnetteJ. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 894 (9th
Cir. 2001) (stating that "each child [with autism] has different needs, different skills,
and a different time frame for effective treatment"); Sch. Bd. v. Brown, 769 F. Supp.
2d 928, 941 (E.D. Va. 2010) (noting that disabilities have different levels of severity
and that each disabled child has unique needs).
211. 150 CONG. REc. S24275 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2004) (statement of Sen. Gregg).
212. 150 CONG. REc. S24276 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2004) (statement of Sen. Reed).
213. OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 19, at 47 (citing N.G. v. District of Columbia, 556 F.
Supp. 2d 11, 16 (D.D.C. 2008)) (explaining that school districts have an obligation under
the IDEA to evaluate children recognized as possibly being disabled).
214. See G.D. ex rel. G.D. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 832 F. Supp. 2d 455, 467 (E.D.
Pa. 2011) (determining that if the school district properly reevaluated the student, it
would not have denied the student FAiPE); D.B. v. Sch. Bd., 708 F. Supp. 2d 564,
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students-a situation that propels special needs children into the
school-to-prison pipeline. Once the child is suspected of having a
disability, he must be evaluated in all areas of suspected disability.215
Thus, when a student's behavior becomes an impediment to his
education-whether it be by way of suspension or frequent removal
from the classroom-it places school officials on notice that the
student may have a behavior-affecting disability.216 Consequently, the
school must conduct an FBA and implement a BIP if less intrusive
remedial strategies do not produce results. 21
1. The procedural denial: Dealing with the "consider" language
The IDEA's "consider" language has been particularly troublesome
in evaluating whether an IEP without an FBA or BIP provides a
student with FAPE."s Initially, it might seem that a school can avoid
violating the IDEA by simply proving that it "consider [ed] "
conducting an FBA and implementing a BIP, but simply chose not to.
Courts, however, have taken a more critical view, weighing the
statute's "consider" language against its clear demand that schools
address student misbehavior.2 1 9
Before it considers implementing an FBA or BIP, the IEP team
must first have determined that a student's behavior is currently or
likely will be an impediment to his receiving an educational
benefit.220 Such a finding is paramount to the team's obligation "to
584-87 (W.D. Va. 2010) (citing inadequate evaluation as a key reason plaintiff was
denied FAPE); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R., 567 F. Supp. 2d 918, 951-52
(W.D. Tex. 2008), affd in part & vacated in part by 591 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2009)
(finding that the child was denied FAPE when the school district did not evaluate the
child in a reasonable amount of time after the district had notice that the child may
have been learning disabled).
215. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b) (3) (B) (2012); Sch. Bd. v. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928,
942 (E.D. Va. 2010).
216. See Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 943; see also W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 501 (3d Cir.
1995), abrogated on other grounds by A.W. v.Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007).
217. OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 19, at 47.
218. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (3) (B) (i).
219. See id. § 1415(k) (1) (D) (ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(d) (ii) (2014); Long v. District
of Columbia, 780 F. Supp. 2d 49, 61 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting the need to intervene
given behavioral needs); Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 943 (same); Shelton v. Maya
Angelou Pub. Charter Sch., 578 F. Supp. 2d 83, 99 (D.D.C. 2008) (same); see also 34
C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A, at 115; Losinski et al., Implications for Practice, supra note 20
(noting circumstances where FBAs must be done, such as when a student is
transferred to another facility because he or she had a weapon, had or used drugs, or
seriously hurt someone).
220. See Long, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 60 (providing that where "a child's behavior
impedes his or her learning or that of others, the IEP team must consider ...
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ensure ... the academic achievement and functional performance of
[the student], [by] us [ing] scientifically based instructional practices,
to the maximum extent possible.""' Once the IEP team determines
behavior is an issue, the use of an FBA and BIP fulfills its obligation
to use scientifically based instructional practices through a procedure
specifically identified within the IDEA."'
Looking at the IDEA's requirements collectively reveals that after
an IEP team considers an FBA and BIP, the evaluation does not end.
Instead, the focus shifts to the efficacy of the BIP in addressing
behavioral issues. In this way, Rowley is inverted and the second,
substantive prong becomes dispositive."' Given the IDEA's directive
that an IEP team respond when an IEP's strategies are not working
and the Act's clear preference for conducting an FBA and
implementing a BIP over other behavior management schemes, 2 2 4
simply noting that the team "considered" the strategies, without
more, violates the IDEA's procedural requirements. 225
2. Child Find
The IDEA recognizes that the quality of a child's education is
"inextricably linked" to his behavior.22 ' Therefore, when a school has
strategies ... to address that behavior" (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (3) (B) (i)).
221. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (5) (E).
222. FBAs and BIPs fall under the peer-reviewed category as interpreted under the
IDEA. See generally Zirkel, Razing Rowley, supra note 97, at 400, 410-11.
223. See, e.g., Long, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 61 ("In light of [the student's] obvious
behavioral issues ... DCPS's failure to complete a BIP/FBA constitutes a denial of []
FAPE."); Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 943 ("[S]everal behavioral incidents leading up to
Student's February 2009 suspension... warranted a[n] [FBA] and, potentially, the
development of a BIP."); A.C. ex rel. MC., 553 F.3d at 172 (holding that the IDEA does
not require an FBA where the IEP provides other effective strategies for addressing the
child's behavioral issues); Shelton, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 99 ("[T] he number of suspensions
and the student's behavior ... should have [warranted] an FBA and BIP .... ).
224. Long, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 61 ("[T]he IDEA .. , recognizes that the quality of a
child's education is inextricably linked to that child's behavior," and "[an] FBA is
essential to addressing a child's behavioral difficulties, and, as such, it plays an
integral role in the development of an IEP." (quoting Harris v. District of
Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.D.C. 2008))).
225. Shelton, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 99 (finding the school personnel's testimony that it
considered an FBA or BIP insufficient, because it did not present "evidence that a
FBA and/or BIP, designed to address the student's behavior violation so that it did
not recur, was inappropriate or unwarranted"); Danielle G. ex rel. Alexander G. v.
N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 06-CV-2152, 2008 WL 3286579, at *10-11, *15 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 7, 2008) (finding that because the student's behaviors continued to impede her
learning, an FBA was required).
226. Harris v. District of Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating
that "an effective educational evaluation must identify behavioral problems").
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notice of a child's behavioral issues, it must conduct an FBA.w
Failing to conduct an FBA contravenes Congress's intent that the Act
support all students with special needs by identifying them early and
2281 uth h
providing them with all necessary services. Furthermore, the
school must conduct the FBA promptly229 : unnecessary delay in
evaluating the student will deny the student FAPE and can lead to
suspension or other irreparable psychological harms.2 " Thus, an FBA
is central to the creation of an IEP for a student with behavioral
needs.231  Consequently, a school cannot provide FAPE without
appropriate evaluation; for a child with behavioral challenges, this
includes an FBA. 3 A school failing to conduct an FBA disregards
the IDEA's mandate to conduct an evaluation of the student in all
areas of suspected disability.233  Without the results of an FBA, a
227. See 34 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A, at 115 ("A failure to ... consider and address
[behaviors impeding learning] in developing and implementing the child's IEP
would constitute a denial of FAPE to the child."); Lauren P. ex rel. David P. v.
Wissahickon Sch. Dist., No. 05-5196, 2007 WL 1810671, *9-10 (E.D. Pa. June 20,
2007) (ordering reimbursement of tuition where the failure to create a BIP
constituted denial of FAPE), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds by 310 F. App'x
552 (3d Cir. 2009); Danielle G. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 06-CV-2152, 2008 WL
3286579, at *10-11, *15 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2008) (declaring that the school should
have addressed the student's known behavioral problems to allow the student to achieve
at a higher level); see also, e.g., Student v. Redlands Unified Sch. Dist., Off. Admin.
Hearings, Special Educ. Division, Case Nos. N2006100159, N2007031009 (Mar. 17, 2008),
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho-decisions/2006100159-20 0 7 03100 9 .pdf.
228. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (26); see also Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230,
245 (2009), affd, 638 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2011) ("A reading of the [IDEA] that left
parents without an adequate remedy when a school district unreasonably failed to
identify a child with disabilities would not comport with Congress' acknowledgment of
the paramount importance of properly identifying each child eligible for services.").
229. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b) (3) (B) (stating that once a child is suspected of being a
child with a disability, "the child [must be] assessed in all areas of [the] suspected
disability") (emphasis added); OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 19, at 47.
230. D.B. v. Sch. Bd., 708 F. Supp. 2d 564, 584-87 (W.D. Va. 2010)
(emphasizing that IEPs must be tailored to the specific student and disability to
ensure realistic goals).
231. Harris v. District of Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.D.C. 2008). But see
M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 2013) ("Failure
to conduct an FBA. . . does not render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA ...
."); Park Hill Sch. Dist. v. Dass, 655 F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
IDEA does not require behavioral assessment in all circumstances); Alex R. ex rel.
Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that the IDEA only requires that a school district consider behavioral
interventions and other strategies when dealing with a disabled student whose
behavior is an impediment to his learning and to the learning of those around him).
232. Long v. District of Columbia, 780 F. Supp. 2d 49, 60-61 (D.D.C. 2011).
233. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b).
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school district is incapable of creating an IEP that is uniquely tailored
to meet the student's specific needs, which, in turn, prevents the IEP
from being reasonably calculated to enable him to receive
educational benefits. 234  Behavior, oftentimes, is the greatest
impediment to a child's education.3 5 Thus, to ignore this
component of a child's disability ignores the root causes of the
greatest barrier to that student's achievement.
3. Snapshot view
A court evaluating the sufficiency of an IEP must focus on whether the
IEP would confer FAPE at the time it is written.2 3 1 The question is
speculative and is not based on whether the student actually benefitted
from the plan.23 ' The IEP, at the time it is written, must include all the
services and supports necessary to adequately meet the student's needs. 3
Although an appropriate education-as contemplated by the
IDEA-is a basic floor upon which schools must build,2 3 ' an IEP must
nevertheless contain all of the services a school district is otherwise
obligated to provide. 2 0 An FBA is essential to mitigating a student's
behavioral problems and serves an "integral role" in creating an
IEP. 2 1' Given that an FBA is an educational evaluation under the
IDEA,42 it must be done for students with behavioral needs to ensure
that the IEP will confer an educational benefit to the student. An IEP
for a student with identified behavioral needs that does not include a
key evaluation and a plan to address misbehavior fails to provide the
benefits Rowley requires.
4. Least restrictive environment
The IDEA directs a school to educate each special needs student
alongside non-disabled peers to the greatest extent possible. To
achieve this goal, the IDEA mandates that a school provide each
234. Long, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 60-61 (concluding that an FBA is needed to "fashion
a legally compliant and educationally beneficial program").
235. See, e.g., Is This Working?, supra note 72 ("[Y]ou... have to nail discipline
before [a teacher] can do anything else in a classroom.").
236. See OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 19, at 35.
237. Id.
238. Id.; see C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2014)
(rejecting the use of "retrospective evidence").
239. Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 195 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Bd.
of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982)).
240. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (1) (A) (i) (IV) (2012).
241. Harris v. District of Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.D.C. 2008).
242. Id.
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student with the supports and accommodations required to foster the
student's inclusion in the general education classroom.2 " Given this
mandate, students who engage in challenging behaviors need the
support that BIPs provide, particularly if those behaviors would
otherwise lead to the student's frequent removal from the
classroom. 244 Normally, an IEP alone will not adequately address the
student's behavioral impediments to receiving an educational
benefit; therefore, a school's failure to also provide a BIP will be both
a technical and substantive violation of the IDEA. Instead, the school
must provide a BIP and maximize the student's chance of inclusion
in the general education classroom, as the IDEA requires."'
Looking to the Child Find requirements, prospective IEP
evaluations, and least restrictive environment provisions collectively,
it is clear that to fulfill Rowley's second prong, a school must create an
IEP that evaluates and responds to every feature of disability that
impacts either the student's behavior or academic performance."4
To adequately ensure that the student's behavior is evaluated and
properly addressed at the time the IEP is written, schools must
conduct an FBA and create a BIP that accounts for the student's
unique behavioral needs."' If the IEP team does not conduct an
FBA, it will not have an adequate foundation upon which to build the
BIP and it will not fulfill its obligations under the IDEA."'
243. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (5).
244. Though it is difficult to determine the frequency of this issue, some school
districts appear to be gaming the system by underreporting the number of
suspensions they serve in a given school year to avoid federal and public scrutiny.
See, e.g., Jim McLaughlin, MPS Reported Incorrect Suspension Data, JOURNAL SENTINEL
(Sept. 2, 2012), http://www.jsonline.com/news/education/mps-reported-incorrect-
suspension-data-7e6vdk-168336126.html.
245. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (5).
246. C.J.N. ex rel. S.K.N. v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 323 F.3d 630, 642 (8th Cir.
2003) ("We believe ... that the student's IEP must be responsive to the student's
specific disabilities, whether academic or behavioral.").
247. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Sch. Bd. v. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928, 944-
45 (E.D. Va. 2010) (explaining that the school did not conduct an FBA or implement
a BIP, failed to create an IEP that was specifically tailored to the student's specific
behavioral issues, and denied the student FAPE).
248. Even if the behavior is "typical" of the student's disability, schools must
nevertheless include an FBA and BIP in the student's IEP. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v.
Benton, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1268, 1273 (S.D. Ala. 2005).
509
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
5. When a school does not support a student with behavioral struggles with
an FBA and a BIP, that student is reasonably likely to be deprived of
educational benefit and thus be denied FAPE
When a child's behavior hinders learning, the IEP team is
obligated to update the student's IEP to address those misbehaviors.
Strategies such as time-outs, detention, and restricted privileges,
when used sparingly, may help to curb a student's misbehavior."'
Alternatively, these approaches, when used frequently, involve the
consistent removal of a child from the classroom; in this case, the
student's behavior is preventing him from being in the classroom and
learning with other, non-disabled students.5 o A school's failure to
address this issue with an FBA and BIP is a denial of FAPE."'
Similarly, when a school suspends a student for ten or more
consecutive or cumulative..2 schooldays and concludes that the
misbehavior that led to the suspension was a manifestation of the
student's disability, the school, if it has not already, must conduct an
FBA."' On this point there is little to debate. Although the lack of
an FBA and BIP in this situation is a clear procedural violation, the
249. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 (1988) (approving these strategies);
Timothy J. Landrum et al., Classroom Misbehavior Is Predictable and Preventable, PHI
DELTA KAPPAN, Oct. 2011, at 30, 32-33; Michael J. Palardy, Dealing with Misbehavior:
Two Approaches, 22J. OF INSTRUCTIONAL PSYCHOL. 135 (1995).
250. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (5) (2012); see Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489
F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasizing the IDEA's "strong preference" for
educating disabled students with non-disabled students); Lillbask v. Conn. Dep't of
Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2005) (same); Danielle G., 2008 WL 3286579, at *4
(same). These kinds of short-term removals also do not amount to a change in
placement that would automatically trigger the need for an FBA and BIP. See Hayes
v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 377, 877 F.2d 809, 813 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that short-
term disciplinary measures do not constitute changes in placement).
251. Lauren P. ex rel. David P. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., No. 05-5196, 2007 WL
1810671, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2007) (finding that the school failed to provide
FAPE when student behavior worsened and it did not respond with FBA or BIP), affd
in part, rev'd in part on othergrounds by 310 F. App'x 552 (3d Cir. 2009).
252. This provision of the IDEA is based on the Supreme Court's holding in Honig
v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988), which specified that a ten-day suspension constituted a
change in placement. 484 U.S. at 325-26 n.8, 328. The Court, however, did not
specify whether its judgment was based on ten consecutive or cumulative days.
Lower courts have since found that ten cumulative days constitute a change in
placement that triggers a school's obligations under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D) (ii).
See, e.g., Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Charles M.F., No. 92-609-M, 1994 WL 485754, at *10
(D.N.H. Aug. 31, 1994).
253. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(d)(ii) (2014). Recall,
however, that if the school concludes that the misconduct was not a manifestation of
the student's disability, it need only "consider" conducting an FBA. See 20 U.S.C. §
1415(k) (1) (A), (D).
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issue of whether it is also deprives a student of educational benefit
continues to plague the judiciary.
6. The substantive denial: Students who are suspended must receive an
updated IEP that incorporates strategies to prevent and correct the
behaviors that led to their suspensions using FBAs and BIPs
An IEP must provide a student with more than a trivial benefit;
otherwise, the school deprives the student FAPE.254 Therefore, if the
school suspends a student, it must use an FBA and BIP to reevaluate
the IEP and make "modifications... designed to address the
behavior so that it does not recur."" The student's suspension
makes it evident that the current IEP is not appropriate. Arguably,
had the student's behavior been escalating, the school should have
already provided the student with an FBA and a BIP."' An extreme
disciplinary action requires a more intrusive intervention-one that
ensures that the IEP is reasonably calculated to afford the child an
educational benefit in the least restrictive environment.
A satisfactory IEP must provide the child with an opportunity for
"significant learning" and "confer meaningful benefit."' An IEP
plays a central role in affording a student with a disability a quality
education.' To that end, the IDEA includes provisions requiring a
school to monitor a student's progress frequently and thoroughly.
Thus, should the student begin to fall behind, the IEP team must
revise that student's IEP.259 These updates include "positive
behavioral interventions and supports."2
To comply with the IDEA, a school must provide all services that a
student needs to derive a meaningful educational benefit.2 11 In
considering which programs to include in a student's IEP, a school
must factor in the student's progress toward his annual goals and
254. See, e.g., Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182
(3d Cir. 1988) (asserting that "states must provide [disabled students] some sort of
meaningful education-more than mere access to the schoolhouse door"); Penn
Trafford Sch. Dist. v. C.F. ex rel. M.F., No. 04-1395, 2006 WL 840334, at *9 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 28, 2006) (citing M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg'1 Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 396 (3d
Cir. 1996)) (explaining that where an IEP confers only de minimis benefits, the
student has been denied FAPE).
255. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (1)(D) (ii).
256. See supra Part II.B (arguing that a school district denies a disabled student
FAPE when it fails to provide an FBA and BIP to address the student's behavioral issues).
257. Polk, 853 F.2d at 182, 184.
258. Harris v. District of Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65 (D.D.C. 2008).
259. Id.
260. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d) (3) (B) (i).
261. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(c) (5) (D), (d) (1) (A), 1401 (3) (A) (ii).
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reevaluation information, including "anticipated needs [and] special
factors."a2 2 If the student's IEP proves to be inadequate, as in the case
of a suspension, the IEP team should address the IEP's deficiencies.26 3
Once it updates the IEP, the IEP team should ensure that the IEP is
"likely to produce progress, not regression or trivial educational
advancement."2  Using an FBA and a BIP provides that assurance.
Schools have an affirmative obligation to evaluate all students
suspected of having a disability in every area in which they are
suspected of being disabled .2" This includes evaluations of a
student's behavior. Once the student has been evaluated, the IEP
team must create an IEP that reflects the findings of the student's
evaluations and provides any supports and related services necessary
to include the student in the general education classroom while
providing him FAPE.2 16  If challenged, a court will review the
student's IEP prospectively. 2" Thus, should the IEP team fail to
fulfill its Child Find obligations and incorporate plans and supports
that will enable the student to gain educational benefits within the
general education setting to the degree it is possible, the IEP team
has denied the student FAPE. This denial makes the school more
likely to suspend the student and cause him to be susceptible to the
school-to-prison pipeline.
262. OsBORNE & Russo, supra note 19, at 102.
263. M.C. ex rel.J.C. v. Cent. Reg'1 Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[A]
child's entitlement to special education should not depend upon the vigilance of the
parents. . . ."); id. ("[A] school district that knows or should know that a child has an
inappropriate IEP or is not receiving more than a de minimis educational benefit
must correct the situation.").
264. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cir.
1997) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 991 (3d Cir.
1986)); accordWalczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998).
265. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b).
266. Id. § 1412(a) (5) (A).
267. See OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 19, at 35 (explaining that a court considers
"whether [an IEP was] reasonably calculated to confer educational benefit at the
time [it was] proposed").
268. See ACLU, LOCATING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE, supra note 7
(explaining that harsh disciplinary policies in schools often push students into the
juvenile justice system); Black Preschoolers Far More Likely to Be Suspended, supra note 82
(pointing out that students of color are far more likely to face suspension or
expulsion than their white counterparts committing the same infractions).
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C. A BIP Must Incorporate the Findings of an FBA and Provide Teachers
with Uniform Strategies to Support the Student's Behavioral Challenges
A school must implement a BIP uniformly throughout the school
day. Determining whether the BIP allows for uniform
implementation requires that it be written. Before challenging the
sufficiency of the BlIP or IEP generally, a parent must first exhaust the
available administrative remedies available. This requirement ensures
that by the time the case reaches the trial court, the issue has been fully
briefed and comes with a complete record to which the court may-and
in some instances must-defer. These procedures avoid the need for a
court to create definitions for FBAs and BIPs and spares a judge from
evaluating the sufficiency of either system without guidance.
1. Because a BIP must be uniformly implemented, it must be in writing
A school's failure to uniformly implement a student's BIP is a
denial of FAPE.2 m Disjointed implementation of a BIP obstructs the
success of the student whom the school-given its decision to create a
BIP for the student-has already recognized as a student with
behavioral issues."o When dealing with students with special needs,
behavior interventions must be implemented in a "very systematic []
and ... structured fashion for [them] to work.""' Therefore,
educators must implement a BIP "consistently across all school settings
by all teachers... .""' Failing to provide a consistent policy for
handling behavior issues denies a student with a disability meaningful
educational benefits and defeats the purpose of the BIP."'
Despite the Eighth Circuit's holding in Renollett" and although
"federal law [does not expressly] require a written BIP,"2 15 to hold
that it is not a necessary component of proper execution would lead
269. M.W. v. Bd. of Educ., Special Educ. No. 06-19, Dep't of Educ. of Alabama, at
83 ("[T]he failure to appropriately implement the Petitioner's [BIP] must be deemed a
denial of Petitioner's right to a [FAPE].") (on file with author).
270. See id. at 82.
271. Id.
272. Lauren P. ex ret. David P. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., No. 05-5196, 2007 WL
1810671, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2007), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds by
310 F. App'x 552 (3d Cir. 2009).
273. Id. at *7 (finding that a student with a disability needs more than just "substantial
accommodations;" rather, a consistent response to behavioral issues is appropriate).
274. Sch. Bd. v. Renollett, 440 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the
school district's failure to include a written BIP for a disabled student did not
deny a student FAPE).
275. Id.atioll.
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to an absurd result. 7 ' Teachers cannot be expected to implement a
plan consistently and uniformly when it is not written down for their
reference. For example, if the school hires a new teacher or engages
a long-term substitute in the middle of the year, that individual will
be practically incapable of implementing the child's BIP uniformly
unless it is written. A school must write the BIP to ensure that each
member of the IEP team and the student's teachers are all on the
same proverbial and literal page.277
This argument, however, does not hold the same weight for an
FBA. It stands to reason that educators would create an FBA from
multiple documents, among other things, which would, in turn,
inform the IEP team on the necessary elements of the BIP. Though
"school officials would be well advised that the safest course of action
is to put [the] FBA[] and [the] BIP[] in writing,"278 the failure to
encapsulate the findings of the FBA into one succinct document may
not necessarily lead to a denial of FAPE or an arbitrary
implementation of a BIP. Thus, the lack of a written FBA is only
relevant to the extent that it leads to an insufficient BIP."'
2. Creating a definition out of "whole cloth ": Getting by with a little help
from their administrative friends
By the time an IDEA case gets to a trial court judge, it has gone
through an exhaustive administrative process that creates a full record,
including testimony from the parties. It most likely also contains a
statement of the substantive requirements of a BIP or FBA and an
276. In addition to using the plain meaning of a particular term, courts look to
whether that particular interpretation is consistent with both "commonsense" and
the intent of the act as a whole. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 733-
34 (2006); see also id. at 734 ("[I]t is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite
another to give it no effect whatever."); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ.,
550 U.S. 81, 98 (2007) (emphasizing that courts should not read "statutory language"
in a way "that ignores its basic purpose and history"). Courts also construe statutes to
avoid absurd results. But see Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987)
(contending that "no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs," and that "it
frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that
whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law"). See generally
Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result
Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 127, 128 (1994).
277. Courts, moreover, will be hard-pressed to evaluate the sufficiency of the IEP if
it is not written.
278. OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 19, at 167.
279. C.F. exrel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 746 F.3d 68,80 (2d Cir. 2014).
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administrative judge's or hearing officer's findings on the sufficiency of an
FBA and a BIP.2 so Ajudge is required to give these findings deference.
Looking to the way in which courts interpret similarly undefined
terms in statutes reveals that when there is a generally accepted
concept of what the term means within the professional field affected
by the regulation, that interpretation can set the adjudicative
standard.28 2 Courts also look to the general intent of the statute to
create a commonsense interpretation of the undefined term."
FBA and BIP are terms known in the education field, and the
standards for the terms are generally accepted." The IDEA,
moreover, has a general intent of inclusion and incorporates Rowley's
definition of FAPE."8  Courts, therefore, should evaluate the
sufficiency of FBAs and BIPs according to their generally accepted
definitions and Rowley's standard for FAPE in a way that fulfills the
IDEA's requirement that evaluations be based on peer-reviewed
research and furthers the Act's stated purpose of ensuring equal
opportunity, meaningful participation, and self-reliance for students
with special needs."' It is clear that schools may not arbitrarily use
behavior intervention strategies that are not supported by research in
the field;.8 . indeed, "[a]n IEP which relies on behavioral
interventions which are not supported by, or are contrary to, the
relevant research may be such that it is not 'reasonably calculated' to
280. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982) (explaining that district
court review is not "an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of
sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review").
281. See, e.g., id.; S. Kingston Sch. Comm. v. Joanna S. ex rel. P.J.S., 773 F.3d 344,
349 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that the proper level of district court review "falls
somewhere between the highly deferential clear-error standard and the non-
deferential de novo standard").
282. Chevron U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843-44 (1984).
283. See supra note 276 (illustrating various approaches courts take in interpreting
statutory language); see also supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (noting that
in Rowley the court used Congress's intent in passing the IDEA to formulate a
definition of FAPE).
284. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (explaining that educators
developed generally accepted definitions for FBAs and BIPs following the 1997
amendments to the IDEA).
285. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(c) (1), 1415(f) (3) (E) (ii) (II) (2012).
286. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1); see also Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000-01
(2014) (relying on relevant professional organizations' views in finding that Florida's
statute, which created a bright-line rule that allowed for the execution of individuals
whose IQs were above seventy, was unconstitutional).
287. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. v. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928, 945 (E.D. Va. 2010) (holding
that because the student's IEP was not "specially designed to meet [his] unique needs
with regard to his behavioral issues," the school denied him FAPE).
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provide an educational benefit."288 Thus, the Act provides standards
for FBAs and BIPs that courts must enforce.
Although courts may not be able to construct "out of whole
cloth"" specific standards for FBAs and BIPs, courts may look to the
generally accepted characteristics of the terms in practice. This
practice might require the use of experts, a procedure allowed under
the IDEA. In fact, in his 2011 study 21o Professor Zirkel noted that
expert witnesses play a notable role in cases where adjudicators
determine an IEP's appropriateness. 291
Moreover, Rowley reveals that courts may properly look to the
purpose of the Act and the generally accepted meaning of the terms
to create a commonsense definition. At a minimum, however, courts
can look to the terms themselves to find an adjudicative standard.
Though it may be a low bar, it is a minimum standard nonetheless:
(1) did the school assess the function the student's misbehavior
serves?, and (2) did the school create a plan that intervened in the
student's misbehaviors? By fulfilling these obligations, schools can
adhere to the IDEA's mandate.
Despite the tools available to it, the Seventh Circuit in Alex R. ex rel.
Beth R. erred when it announced that a BIP cannot "fall[] short of
substantive criteria that do not exist."29 2 Here, despite the summary
conclusion its holding suggests, the court analyzed the BIP's
sufficiency, finding that the school continually evaluated and updated
the student's IEP, worked with the student's mother to implement it,
and collected data to create the plan it eventually implemented.29 3
Although the plan was futile," at the time it was written, it was
reasonable to expect it would be successful in supporting the
student's needs. Although the court's holding here ultimately came
to a result with which this Comment can agree, it sets a dangerous
precedent for the future that, without congressional intervention,
may lead to deficient results for future plaintiffs.
288. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Douglas L. ex rel. Isabel L., 51 Individuals with
Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (IDELR) No. 15, at 82, 90 n.20 (S.D. Iowa, Aug. 7, 2008).
289. Alex R. ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit. Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d
603, 615 (7th Cir. 2004) (declining to fabricate specific substantive criteria for BIPs
absent congressional or agency direction).
290. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
291. Zirkel, Empirical Analysis, supra note 23, at 203.
292. 375 F.3d 603, 615 (2004).
293. Id. at 615-16.
294. Id. at 609 (despite the BIP, Alex ran away from school and, "[a] fter a three-hour
search involving both fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, as well as searchers on the ground,
rescuers found [nine-year-old] Alex stuck in the muddy banks of the Leaf River").
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D. Recommendations
1. Making the case for FBAs and BIPs
When an IEP team intervenes early, a BIP can be crucial in
preventing the problem behavior from becoming a chronic issue.295 A
BIP reduces misbehavior so that punishment is no longer necessary."' To
develop a meaningful BIP, it is vital that stakeholders first understand why
the student is misbehaving.29 7 According to the IDEA, the best way to
understand the function of a student's behavior is to conduct an FBA"
An FBA is a method of behavior analysis that gives legal guardians
and school officials the opportunity to understand what the student is
seeking to gain from defiance.' Misbehaviors are often context-related,
and an FBA helps stakeholders anticipate what situations cause a student
to act outsoo With this information, a student's IEP team is able to
collectively and proactively respond to the student's problem behaviors
with a targeted, uniform BIP calibrated to that child's unique needs.3 o'
Many case studies have shown overwhelmingly positive results when
BIPs emphasize positive interventions that create supportive
classroom environments. 30 2  For example, one case study by Joe
295. Timothy R. Vollmer & John Northup, Some Implications of Functional Analysis
for School Psychology, 11 SCH. PSYCHOL. Q. 76, 81-82 (1996).
296. Suzanne Zimmerman, Eliminating Argumentative Behavior in a Young Student: A
Single Subject Case Study and Intervention Plan (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Martin Luther College) 13-15, https://www.mic-wels.edu/library/search-find-
2/special-collections/pdf-files/SuziZimmermanFieldProject.pdf (noting that since
the use of positive reinforcement helps to change the targeted behavior, praising
students is the most effective method in fostering desired behaviors).
297. Id.
298. Kim Killu, Developing Effective Behavior Intervention Plans: Suggestions for School
Personnel, 43 INTERVENTION IN SCH. & CLINIC 140, 140-41 (2008) (noting that when
Congress reauthorized the IDEA in 2004, it required that an FBA be conducted prior
to the development of a BIP).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 142.
301. Id. at 141-42, 144-46.
302. See, e.g., Carol Ann Davis & Joe Reichle, Variant and Invariant High-Probability
Requests: Increasing Appropriate Behaviors in Children with Emotional-Behavioral Disorders,
29 J. OF APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 471, 476, 479-80 (1996) (noting an increase in
compliant behavior improving from nineteen percent to eighty-nine percent of the
time); Pamela R. Dodge, Managing School Behavior: A Qualitative Case Study 2, 12, 14,
16, 36 (2011) (published Ph.D. dissertation, Iowa State University),
http://ib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3016&context=etd; Glen
Dunlap et al., The Effects of Multi-component, Assessment-Based Curricular Modifications on
the Classroom Behavior of Children with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, 6J. OF APPLIED
BEHAV. EDuc. 481, 495 (1996) (noting an increase in assessment accuracy from thirty-
one percent to 100 percent); Anne Todd et al., Teaching Recess: Low Cost Efforts
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Reichle, Professor of Educational Psychology at the University of
Minnesota, found that after implementing a positive BIP based on a
comprehensive FBA, a student's behavior improved from being
compliant nineteen percent of the time to eighty-nine percent of the
time.so3 Ultimately, the positive results BIPs can facilitate provide
greater opportunities for learning and better educational outcomes
for students with behavioral needs. Overall, this means fewer
students succumbing to the school-to-prison pipeline.
To provide the greatest benefits for students, BIPs should
emphasize the use of positive, inclusive, and least restrictive
approaches to improving student behavior." Educators and parents
must have the support and resources they need to understand and
implement their role in the plan.so' Similarly, the plan should
involve the student as an equal partner: "[p]roviding clear
expectations for [a] studen[t] is [an] essential part [of a BIP]."soe
Creating clear expectations that incorporate best practices and
ensuring that students and teachers use common language to
describe behaviors and consequences will require that Congress
define the necessary components of both FBAs and BIPs."
2. Amending the 1DEA: Clarity, clarity, clarity
The 2004 amendments to the IDEA, while bringing greater clarity
to the realm of discipline, have nevertheless made it difficult for
educational rights-holders to find attorneys to represent them.3 0"
Although the amended Act retained its predecessor's fee-shifting
Producing Effective Results, 4J. OF POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 46, 50 (2002) (noting
an eighty percent decrease in disciplinary referrals after completion of training and
implementation of the school-wide plan).
303. Davis & Reichle, supra note 302, at 476-78.
304. SeeJAMES P. CLARK, NAT'L Ass'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, FUNCTIONAL BEHAVIORAL
ASSESSMENT AND BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTION PLANS: IMPLEMENTING THE STUDENT
DISCIPLINE PROVISIONS OF IDEA '97: A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GUIDE FOR SCHOOL
SOCIAL WORKERS 6-7 (1998), http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED455632 (arguing that these
positive restrictive provisions are intended to expand the responses and resources
available to schools in handling students with problematic behavior).
305. See id. at 5 (noting that an FBA provides parents and educators with additional
information that should be used in the development of behavioral intervention plans).
306. Zimmerman, supra note 296, at 13.
307. Evaluating the best practices for conducting FBAs and implementing BIPs is
beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of possible requirements, see Rikki
K. Wheatley et al., Improving Behavior through Differential Reinforcement: A Praise Note
System for Elementary School Students, 32 EDUc. & TREATMENT OF CHILD. 551, 556 (2009).
308. See Alex J. Hurder, Left Behind with No "IDEA": Children with Disabilities Without
Means, 34 B.C.J. L. & Soc.Just. 283, 303 (2014).
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provision, special education attorneys are more hesitant to represent
parents without being paid up front." Overall, since the 2004 IDEA
amendments, the outcome of FBA and BIP cases has shifted from being
more favorable to parents to being more favorable to school districts.3 ,0
In her article Bidding (Fair)well to Due Process: The Need for a Fairer
Final Stage in Special Education Dispute Resolution, Cali Cope-Kasten,
then-law student at the University of Michigan, found that "during a
ten-year period across two states, [Wisconsin and Minnesota,] no
parent was able to prevail over a school district if the parent did not have
an attorney.""' Given that two-thirds of the six million children
protected by the IDEA live in households with incomes of $50,000 or
less,"' children with special needs are more likely to live in poverty than
their peers,313 and minority students are disproportionately classified as
having special needs, 31 the students most affected by the school-to-
prison pipeline are the least likely to be represented by an attorney.
If the family is able to retain counsel, or if they decide to pursue
legal action without it, the party challenging the appropriateness of
the IEP bears the burden of proof in a due process hearing."'
Regardless of whether the parent is without counsel, school districts
will always be equipped with a legal representative.31 6 Compounding
this issue is the Supreme Court's 2006 ruling that a school need not
provide the cost of experts to prevailing parents.31" Without better
guidance on what must be included in an FBA or a BIP, parents and
students bringing due process complaints will routinely rely on the
testimony of experts" to opine on whether the student's FBA and BIP
309. See Elisa Hyman et al., How IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and
Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering 20 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc.
POL'Y & L. 107, 113-15, 127, 141-42 (2011).
310. Zirkel, EmpiricalAnalysis, supra note 23, at 205.
311. Cali Cope-Kasten, Bidding (Fair)well to Due Process: The Need for a Fairer Final Stage
in SpecialEducationDispute Resolution, 42J. L. & EDuC. 501, 528 (2013) (emphasis added).
312. Hyman, supra note 309, at 112-13.
313. See id. (explaining that two million children with disabilities protected by the
IDEA live below the poverty line).
314. See Yael Cannon, A Solution Hiding in Plain Sight: Special Education and Better
Outcomes for Students with Social Emotional and Behavioral Challenges, 41 FoRDHAM URB.
L.J. 403, 410 (2013).
315. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57-59 (2005).
316. Susan Boswell, Parents May Self-Represent in IDEA Cases, THE ASHA LEADER
(June 19, 2007) at 1, http://leader.pubs.asha.org/article.aspx?articleid=2278168.
But see 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(a) (ii) (2007) (explaining that during a mediation session,
a school district may not bring an attorney unless the parent is represented).
317. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 293-94 (2006).
318. See Zirkel, Empirical Analysis, supra note 23, at 203.
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comply with peer-reviewed research"' or to cross-examine school
districts' witnesses, a service many parents simply cannot afford. For many
students, that means their rights under the IDEA go unenforced.
Overall, because Congress has failed to promulgate explicit
requirements of when a student is entitled to an FBA and a BIP and
has not outlined specific substantive requirements for either behavior
modification technique, courts have struggled to develop and
implement uniform standards. The courts' confusion has led to
ambiguous standards for schools and ultimately lower standards for
students. To provide courts and schools with greater clarity, Congress
should amend the IDEA to include the baseline elements of what is
required when a school decides to provide a student with an FBA or BIP.
Several states have filled that definitional gap3 20 and Congress
should look to these standards for guidance when creating federal
definitions. To that end, Congress should mandate that an FBA
clearly identify and define a student's problem behaviors. An FBA
can complete this task by using concrete examples of the specific
contextual factors contributing to the student's misbehavior. The
analysis would then formulate a theory as to the behavior's function
and the consequences that serve to maintain them.3 2 ' A BIP,
moreover, should be based on the findings of an FBA and articulate
strategies to address the unique needs of the student and specifically
address the ways in which the student's stakeholders will uniformly
implement the plan. In many ways, this simply codifies standards
courts have already upheld.2
319. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (highlighting the significance
of peer-reviewed techniques in a student's IEP).
320. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 226.75 (2015) (defining and creating
guidelines for FBAs); 511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-32-41 (2015) (defining FBAs); MINN. R.
3525.0850 (2015) (creating guidelines for BIPs); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, §
200.1 (r) (2015) (defining requirements of FBAs).
321. This definition is based on the New York statute. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 8, § 200.1(r) (2015) (defining requirements of FBAs). Perry A. Zirkel offers
these criteria when using an FBA or BIP for a student with behavioral issues:
special education experts recommend FBAs as the foundational steps of a
two-pronged strategy that should include the following core components
and culminate in a BIP: (1) operational definitions of problem behaviors;
(2) descriptions of the assessment conditions that may reliably predict the
occurrence and nonoccurrence of problem behaviors; (3) descriptions of
the consequence events that maintain problem behaviors; (4) direct
observation of the problem behaviors across the assessment conditions; and
(5) a BIP based on the analysis of this information.
Zirkel, supra note 23, at 179-80.
322. See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' tendency to
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Finally, Congress should purify the brackish water that the
"consider" language has created regarding FBAs and BIPs by
removing the term and delineating three situations in which FBAs
and BIPs are required in its place. The first situation is when a
student is suspended: the FBA and BIP should be completed when
the behavior is determined to be a manifestation of the student's
disability. The second situation would arise when a team reconvenes
to review or update a student's IEP. During its review of the IEP, the
team must determine whether a student has behavioral issues, and
whether those issues are impairing the student's access to education.
If the IEP team answers both questions in the affirmative, an FB A
and a BIP should be required. Alternatively, should the team
determine an FBA and a BIP are not needed, the Act should require
that the team briefly justify its determination. This procedure would
still allow an IEP team to "consider" a student's behavior but would
remove the guesswork currently involved in the evaluation. Finally,
because an FBA is considered an evaluation under the IDEA,123 the
third situation in which an FBA and a BIP should be required is
whenever a parent, teacher or educational rights-holder requests one,
or when the student's misbehaviors puts the school on notice that he
or she is a student with a behavioral disability. 2 1 This amendment
would put FBAs and BIPs expressly in line with other evaluations required
under the IDEA's Child Find provisions, placing an affirmative obligation
on schools to identify and assess students with behavioral needs and
furthering the Act's objectives of ensuring that each child with a disability
experiences success and self-sufficiency in school and beyond.
3. Securing adequate funding
The IDEA mandates that trained and knowledgeable personnel
conduct evaluations.' Given the realities of funding for schools,3 2 6
find no IDEA violation where schools rely on an adequate FBA substitute to create an IEP).
323. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
324. A parent can already request an evaluation pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §
1414(a)(1)(B); the proposed amendment would simply clarify that a parent may
request an FBA pursuant to that provision.
325. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b) (3) (A) (iv) (2012).
326. See 150 Cong. Rec. 2126 (2004) (statement of Rep. Schakowsky) ("I would
like to express my disappointment that [the IDEA] still does not force us to live up to
our funding promises for IDEA. Ever since IDEA's initial enactment in 1975, the law
has included a commitment to pay [forty] percent of the average per student cost for
every special education student. The federal government currently pays for about
[nineteen] percent of the cost of educating a child with disabilities and at the
current rate of increase we will never reach that promised level of funding."); see atso
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however-and although the most qualified person to conduct an FBA
and create a BIP would be a school psychologist-teachers, with the
support and input of the IEP team, are also capable of creating
substantively appropriate BIPs and FBAs.127 The student's teachers
and stakeholders likely know the student best. Through the use of
various surveys and other data, a student's school will be able to
discern the likely causes of the student's misbehavior.
As a supplement, Congress should task the U.S. Department of
Education, through a partnership with trained school psychologists,
with creating a template to use when conducting an FBA.12' This
template would support teachers tasked with conducting FBAs by
removing some of the burdens associated with overseeing evaluations
and allowing Congress and the Department of Education to set peer-
reviewed standards to consider when evaluating children's behavioral
impediments. This would support teachers who are already busy by
creating a template they can use and reassuring them that the process
is adequate to meet the requirements of the IDEA.
CONCLUSION
Schools are required to provide students with special needs plans
that are reasonably likely to provide the student with an educational
benefit at the time it is written. To ensure this requirement is
satisfied, schools must evaluate the function of a student's
misbehavior and create a plan to intervene in those misbehaviors
based on that data. In this way, the school complies with the IDEA by
fostering the students' ability to be taught alongside their
nondisabled peers. By ensuring that FBAs and BIPs are in place and
uniformly implemented for students with special needs, schools can
be at the forefront of ending the school-to-prison pipeline.
The nationwide implementation of zero-tolerance policies,
increased police presence in schools, and corporal punishment and
restraint have exacerbated the mass incarceration of students with
disabilities. These systems of behavior modification and punishment
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, 777 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-48
(1975)) (providing that the federal government will pay forty percent of the average
per pupil expenditure of both public elementary and secondary school education).
327. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(10) (noting that the IDEA requires that teachers be
"highly qualified").
328. For example, the template could detail specific questions the person
conducting the FBA should ask regarding the student's behavior and include a list of
stakeholders to whom the questions should be posed.
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have proven largely unsuccessful.3" The Rowley standard, though it
establishes a low threshold, requires that schools give all students,
regardless of disability, an equal chance at achieving educational
success. For students with behavioral needs, that means FBAs and
BIPs. Proactively addressing student misbehavior can support
students and teachers by preventing the need for physical discipline
and restraint, thus breaking the cycle of misbehavior and
punishment. Courts have recognized these systems' "fundamental
connection to the quality of a disabled child's education" and their
role in "formulating an IEP tailored to the needs of individual
disabled children."sso This sentiment is not echoed in the legal
realm, however. As a result, to fully realize the potential benefits of
these programs, Congress must strengthen and clarify their
requirements. By implementing substantive standards for FBAs and
BIPs-procedures that are essential to assisting a child whose
behavior affects his and his classmates' access to education 3 3 1 _
policymakers can level the playing field for special needs children
while raising the bar for all students, ensuring educational results 1 2
and closing off the school-to-prison pipeline.
329. See IMPAIRING EDUCATION, supra note 83, at 4 ("[C]orporal punishment is
rarely effective in teaching students to refrain from violent behavior, and .. . it causes
students to become disengaged and reluctant to learn."); see also Archer, supra note 84,
at 869 ("Indeed, policies such as policing in schools and zero tolerance have been shown
to be ineffective as corrective measures and instead serve to demoralize our children.").
The use of these methods should be reformed, but an in-depth analysis of such reforms is
beyond the scope of this Article. For a thoughtful discussion on corporal punishment, see
generally Kearney, supra note 84, and Urbonya, supra note 84, at 400,417-18.
330. Harris v. District of Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.D.C. 2008).
331. Id. at 67-68.
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